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Full-Text Articles in Law

Antitrust And Platform Monopoly, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Nov 2021

Antitrust And Platform Monopoly, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Are large digital platforms that deal directly with consumers “winner take all,” or natural monopoly, firms? That question is surprisingly complex and does not produce the same answer for every platform. The closer one looks at digital platforms the less they seem to be winner-take-all. As a result, competition can be made to work in most of them. Further, antitrust enforcement, with its accommodation of firm variety, is generally superior to any form of statutory regulation that generalizes over large numbers.

Assuming that an antitrust violation is found, what should be the remedy? Breaking up large firms subject to extensive …


Freedom Without Opportunity: Using Medicare Policy And Cms Mechanisms To Anticipate The Platform Economy’S Pitfalls And Ensure Healthcare Platform Workers Are Fairly Paid, Kim A. Aquino Sep 2021

Freedom Without Opportunity: Using Medicare Policy And Cms Mechanisms To Anticipate The Platform Economy’S Pitfalls And Ensure Healthcare Platform Workers Are Fairly Paid, Kim A. Aquino

Brooklyn Law Review

The rapidly aging population, along with the demand for innovative Medicare delivery models such as bundled payment programs have incentivized the use of technology in healthcare because of its potential to cut costs and improve quality of care. Like many industries embracing technological strides to automate and digitize services, the healthcare industry has welcomed new labor markets like the platform economy to facilitate connections between patients and workers with ease. Along with streamlining connections, the platform economy also promises workers flexibility and autonomy over their own schedule. The platform economy’s promise of freedom, however, is not enough to prevent the …


Appreciating The Overlooked Contributions Of The New Harvard School, Christopher S. Yoo Jul 2021

Appreciating The Overlooked Contributions Of The New Harvard School, Christopher S. Yoo

All Faculty Scholarship

My colleague, Herbert Hovenkamp, is almost universally recognized as the most cited and the most authoritative US antitrust scholar. Among his many honors, his status as the senior author of the authoritative Areeda and Hovenkamp treatise makes him the unquestioned leader of the New Harvard School, which has long served as the bellwether for how courts are likely to resolve emerging issues in modern antitrust doctrine. Unfortunately, its defining tenets and its positions on emerging issues remain surprisingly obscure. My contribution to this festschrift explores the core commitments that distinguish the New Harvard School from other approaches to antitrust. It …


Antitrust Harm And Causation, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jul 2021

Antitrust Harm And Causation, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

How should plaintiffs show harm from antitrust violations? The inquiry naturally breaks into two issues: first, what is the nature of the harm? and second, what does proof of causation require? The best criterion for assessing harm is likely or reasonably anticipated output effects. Antitrust’s goal should be output as high as is consistent with sustainable competition.

The standard for proof of causation then depends on two things: the identity of the enforcer and the remedy that the plaintiff is seeking. It does not necessarily depend on which antitrust statute the plaintiff is seeking to enforce. For public agencies, enforcement …


Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review Jan 2021

Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review

Seattle University Law Review

Table of Contents.


The Looming Crisis In Antitrust Economics, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2021

The Looming Crisis In Antitrust Economics, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

As in so many areas of law and politics in the United States, antitrust’s center is at bay. It is besieged by a right wing that wants to limit antitrust even more than it has been limited over the last quarter century. On the left, it faces revisionists who propose significantly greater enforcement.

One thing the two extremes share, however, is denigration of the role of economics in antitrust analysis. On the right, the Supreme Court’s two most recent antitrust decisions at this writing reveal that economic analysis no longer occupies the central role that it once had. On the …


Vertical Mergers In A Model Of Upstream Monopoly And Incomplete Information, Serge Moresi, David Reitman, Steven C. Salop, Yianis Sarafidis Jan 2021

Vertical Mergers In A Model Of Upstream Monopoly And Incomplete Information, Serge Moresi, David Reitman, Steven C. Salop, Yianis Sarafidis

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

We examine the role of private information on the impact of vertical mergers. A vertical merger can improve the information that is available to an upstream monopolist because, after the merger, the monopolist can observe the cost of its downstream merger partner. In the pre-merger world, because the costs of the downstream firms are private information, the monopolist has incomplete information and cannot implement the monopoly outcome: The expected pre-merger equilibrium price of the downstream product is lower than the monopoly price. After a vertical merger, the equilibrium input price that is charged to the downstream rival can either increase …


Everything You Always Wanted To Know About Gouging (But Were Afraid To Ask): A Response To Ramsi Woodcock, Brian L. Frye Jan 2021

Everything You Always Wanted To Know About Gouging (But Were Afraid To Ask): A Response To Ramsi Woodcock, Brian L. Frye

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Good scholarship makes you change your mind, but great scholarship

makes you think differently. As usual, Ramsi Woodcock's article "The Efficient

Queue and the Case Against Dynamic Pricing", is great, because it made me

think differently about price regulation. Woodcock observes that prices not

only communicate information, but also redistribute resources. Sometimes,

producers change prices in response to competition or changes in the cost of

production. But other times, they change prices just because they can.

When prices reflect the marginal cost of production, consumers benefit

from market efficiencies. But when prices reflect a surge in demand, they

simply transfer …