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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
Computational Complexity And Tort Deterrence, Joshua C. Teitelbaum
Computational Complexity And Tort Deterrence, Joshua C. Teitelbaum
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Standard formulations of the economic model of tort deterrence constitute the injurer as the unboundedly rational bad man. Unbounded rationality implies that the injurer can always compute the solution to his care-taking problem. This in turn implies that optimal liability rules can provide robust deterrence, for they can always induce the injurer to take socially optimal care. In this paper I examine the computational complexity of the injurer's care-taking problem. I show that the injurer's problem is computationally tractable when the precaution set is unidimensional or convex, but that it is computationally intractable when the precaution set is multidimensional and …
Potential Competition And Antitrust Analysis: Monopoly Profits Exceed Duopoly Profits, Steven C. Salop
Potential Competition And Antitrust Analysis: Monopoly Profits Exceed Duopoly Profits, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This short note prepared for an OECD meeting in June 2021 examines several antitrust issues involving analysis of potential competition. While the analysis is not new, it is still useful to collect them together in a unified fashion to show how they are related. In this regard, all the analysis and conclusions flow from the overarching (and obvious) points that exclusionary conduct and agreements that maintain monopoly power very often harm consumers, and that monopoly profits typically exceed the combined duopoly profits earned by the dominant firm and the entrant, if there is successful entry. While this is not inevitably …
Executive Action To Expand Health Services In The Biden Administration, Timothy M. Westmoreland, Maxwell Gregg Bloche, Lawrence O. Gostin
Executive Action To Expand Health Services In The Biden Administration, Timothy M. Westmoreland, Maxwell Gregg Bloche, Lawrence O. Gostin
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
President Biden’s health platform is ambitious, encompassing a public insurance option, a reduced age of eligibility for Medicare, and expanded tax credits to subsidize premiums. Yet, with divided government, he may be unable to achieve bold health reforms. However, his administration can substantially improve health care access through executive action. In this Viewpoint, we propose a series of measures that could increase access to insurance coverage and health care that are achievable under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and Medicaid.
Trade, Economy, And Work: A Shared Agenda For A Stronger Economic Future, Alvaro Santos, Christopher Wilson
Trade, Economy, And Work: A Shared Agenda For A Stronger Economic Future, Alvaro Santos, Christopher Wilson
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The economies of the United States and Mexico have become inextricably linked. For both countries, the other is their top trading partner, with an annual value of $616.38 billion in 2019. Beyond cross-border trade, however, our global competitiveness is linked due to the depth of manufacturing integration. As a result, job creation and export growth are largely regional enterprises. Well over a billion dollars in commerce crosses the border each day, and the GDP of the six Mexican and four U.S. border states is larger than the GDP of all but the three largest countries in the world.
The new …
Vertical Mergers In A Model Of Upstream Monopoly And Incomplete Information, Serge Moresi, David Reitman, Steven C. Salop, Yianis Sarafidis
Vertical Mergers In A Model Of Upstream Monopoly And Incomplete Information, Serge Moresi, David Reitman, Steven C. Salop, Yianis Sarafidis
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
We examine the role of private information on the impact of vertical mergers. A vertical merger can improve the information that is available to an upstream monopolist because, after the merger, the monopolist can observe the cost of its downstream merger partner. In the pre-merger world, because the costs of the downstream firms are private information, the monopolist has incomplete information and cannot implement the monopoly outcome: The expected pre-merger equilibrium price of the downstream product is lower than the monopoly price. After a vertical merger, the equilibrium input price that is charged to the downstream rival can either increase …