Law Commons^™

Why Law Now Needs To Control Rather Than Follow Neo-Classical Economics, John William Draper

Pace Environmental Law Review

This article argues that neo-classical economics places an emphasis on short-term gain over precaution, and in doing so, places the lives of a myriad of individual humans—and even the species itself—at risk. Given the foreseeable risks, if humanity wants to survive longer, we need to rethink our economic principles and priorities and the relationship between economics and law.

I begin with a most brief overview of the various sources of risk to the human species and its life support system. Then I will move on to look at how neo-classical economics interacts with significant risk.

Equity And Feasibility Regulation, Dov Waisman

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Trust And Control: The Value Effect Of Venture Capital Term Sheet Provisions As Risk Allocation Tools, Jason M. Gordon, David Orozco

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

The parties to a venture funding agreement are in a state of coopetition. The parties account for perceived risk in the entrepreneur-investor relationship through varying levels of control demanded from and trust afforded to the other party. The level of risk perceived by each party may differ along individual aspects of the prospective equity deal. The provisions of the term sheet delineate the subjective risk perceptions of each party to the transaction by allocating control or trusting a party with decision-making rights. When negotiating term sheet provisions, a party should seek to understand and recognize the risk perceived by the …

The Cost Of Nothing Trumps The Value Of Everything: The Failure Of Regulatory Economics To Keep Pace With Improvements In Quantitative Risk Analysis, Adam M. Finkel

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

The entire U.S. federal regulatory apparatus, especially that part devoted to reducing (or deciding not to reduce) risks to the environment, health, and safety (EHS), relies increasingly on judgments of whether each regulation would yield benefits in excess of its costs. These judgments depend in turn upon empirical analysis of the potential increases in longevity, quality of life, and environmental quality that the regulation can confer, and also of the economic resources needed to “purchase” those benefits—analyses whose quality can range from extremely fine to disappointingly poor. The quality of a risk analysis (from which the benefits of control are …

Risky Returns: Accounting For Risk In The Federal Budget, David Kamin

Indiana Law Journal

There has been a growing consensus among academics, analysts, and policymakers that the official federal budget estimates should reflect the “cost of risk”—the amount that the private market would demand to bear risk. The result would be to add tens, if not hundreds, of billions of dollars in annual costs to the federal budget and, in combination with the budget enforcement laws now in place, make it much more difficult for the federal government to create or expand programs that involve risk—ranging from student lending to home mortgage guarantees to, potentially, broad social insurance programs like unemployment insurance. This Article …

American Parent Bank Liability For Foreign Branch Deposits: Which Party Bears Sovereign Risk?, Adam Telanoff

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

A Financial Economic Theory Of Punitive Damages, Robert J. Rhee

Michigan Law Review

This Article provides a financial economic theory of punitive damages. The core problem, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, is not the systemic amount of punitive damages in the tort system; rather it is the risk of outlier outcomes. Low frequency, high severity awards are unpredictable, cause financial distress, and beget social cost. By focusing only on offsetting escaped liability, the standard law and economics theory fails to account for the core problem of variance. This Article provides a risk arbitrage analysis of the relationship between variance, litigation valuation, and optimal deterrence. Starting with settlement …

Forward Contracts - Prohibitions On Risk And Speculation Under Islamic Law, Nicholas C. Dau-Schmidt

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

Forward contracts allow buyers and sellers of goods to reduce risk by contracting for sale at a predetermined price and quantity prior to the actual exchange of goods and payment. While forward contracts are extensively used in the Western world without restriction, those who adhere to Islamic law are often constrained by principles intended to reduce risk, gambling, and usury. These principles can prove overly restrictive; however, Islamic law restrictions also illuminate the problems associated with the overly permissive Western system in which speculators contract in a manner tantamount to gambling-a problem associated with the recent financial crisis. This Note …

The Meaning Of The Market Myth, Benjamin Means

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

This Book Review contends that the perfectly rational market may be a myth, not just in the sense of a false or over-simplified account of reality, but also in the deeper, anthropological sense of cultural explanation. Part I describes how rational-market theories were developed by financial economists and applied to Wall Street, sometimes without adequate appreciation for the difference between simplified economic models and real-world behavior. Part II contends that if the rational-market theory has met with acceptance that outstrips its empirical support, the favorable reception may be explained in part by the theory’s congruence with broader normative views about …

A Board’S Duty To Monitor, Eric J. Pan

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Insufficient Activity And Tort Liability: A Rejoinder, David Gilo, Ehud Guttel

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In our article, Negligence and Insufficient Activity, we proposed that tort scholarship has overlooked the risk that injurers will behave strategically in setting their activity levels. Whereas the standard literature has predicted that injurers who are subject to a negligence regime will often invest efficiently in care but choose excessive activity levels, we showed that they may do exactly the opposite: injurers may deliberately restrict their activity to avoid investments in socially desirable precaution. After reviewing the conditions that may give rise to the risk of insufficient activity, we examined the ways in which the legal system can minimize the …

Activity Levels Under The Hand Formula: A Comment On Gilo And Guttel, Richard A. Epstein

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

A response to David Gilo & Ehud Guttel, Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 277 (2009). Within the law and economics field, there often surfaces a near hypnotic attraction to the Hand formula as the one and only tool that drives tort law toward economic efficiency. Hand's intuition was, of course, that the test for efficiency requires a balancing of three variables. The burden of taking particular precautions is compared to the expected loss from some activity, which in turn consists of the likelihood of some particular harm multiplied by its anticipated severity. …

Another Theory Of Insufficient Activity Levels, Mark Grady

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

A response to David Gilo & Ehud Guttel, Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, 108 Mich L. Rev. 277 (2009). Professors David Gilo and Ehud Guttel have written an important article on the tendency of the negligence rule to produce inefficiently low activity levels. In Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, the authors claim insufficient activity to be the "missing paradigm" in tort theory. Although I agree with Gilo and Guttel that this missing paradigm is central to negligence doctrine, I disagree with them about how insufficient activity levels arise.

Insufficient Analysis Of Insufficient Activity, Kenneth S. Abraham

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

A response to David Gilo & Ehud Guttel, Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, 108 Mich L. Rev. 277 (2009). In Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, David Gilo and Ehud Guttel argue that negligence law encourages inefficiently high and low levels of activity because negligence law ordinarily does not take activity levels into account. They suggest that the law should impose liability for failing to take safety precautions-even where precautions would not be cost-justified-whenever the threat of this liability negates the incentive for an actor to choose an insufficient level of activity. Until …

Dilution Of Liability And Multiple Tortfeasors In The Context Of Liability For Unrequested Precautions, Assaf Jacob

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

A Response to Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108 Mich. L. Rev. (2009). One of the more intriguing questions in tort law is the case of joint and several tortfeasors and the dilution-of-liability puzzle. When harm materializes and there are multiple potential tortfeasors, the law tends to limit the number of joint tortfeasors, focusing the final burden on a small number of actors. This limitation is achieved by several legal mechanisms, such as a no duty rule, a narrow interpretation of negligence, a restrictive implementation of the causal link (be it the but for …

Proposed Legislation: A (Second) Modest Proposal To Protect Virginia Consumers Against Defective Products, Peter Nash Swisher

University of Richmond Law Review

The purpose of this article is to suggest a viable, necessary, and eminently reasonable legislative alternative that the Virginia General Assembly should enact for legitimate and pressing public policy reasons in order to properly protect Virginia consumers from defective and unreasonably dangerous consumer products.Adopting this alternative would bring the Commonwealth of Virginia into the mainstream of twenty-first century American, and transnational, products liability law.

Securities Disclosure In A Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, Merritt B. Fox

Michigan Law Review

One of the most dramatic examples of increasing interaction across national boundaries in recent years has been the burgeoning volume of transnational transactions in corporate equities. Most developed capitalist countries impose affirmative obligations on issuers of corporate equity to disclose certain information about themselves. While these obligations are imposed on issuers, they are triggered by transactions. The growth in transnational transactions is thus increasingly raising difficult issues concerning the reach of differing national regimes. Given the magnitude of legal resources devoted to compliance with such disclosure regulations, they promise to feature prominently in the larger discussion of the role of …

The Idea Of Fairness In The Law Of Enterprise Liability, Gregory C. Keating

Michigan Law Review

The theory and practice of enterprise liability are oddly disjoined. On the one hand, case rhetoric insists that considerations of fairness are among the primary justifications for imposing enterprise liability. On the other hand, normatively inclined and theoretically ambitious scholarship on enterprise liability is overwhelmingly economic in cast. Economically inclined scholars have flocked to the field, while other kinds of tort theorists have shunned it, implicitly or explicitly conceding it to economic analysis. This paper argues that, contrary to this consensus, there is a powerful and important fairness case to be made for enterprise liability. This case fits the rhetoric …

Risk Regulations And Its Hazards, Stephen F. Williams

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation by Stephen Breyer

Liberal Markets, Jeremy Waldron

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Risks and Wrongs by Jules L. Coleman

Book Review, Hugh H. Gibbons

RISK: Health, Safety & Environment (1990-2002)

Reviews of the following books: K. S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, Risk AND RATIONALITY (U. California Press 1991) [312 pp.] Index of Names, Index of Subjects, Notes. CIP 91-3294; ISBN 0-520-07287-1 (Cloth $39.95); ISBN 0-520-07289-8 (Pbk. $15.95). [2120 Berkeley Way, Berkeley, CA 94720.] W. KIP VisCusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Harvard U. Press 1991). [270 pp.] Appendices, bibliography, index, notes. CIP 90-23161, ISBN 0-674-75323-2 (Cloth $39.95). [79 Garden Street Cambridge, MA 02138.]

Products Liability Based Upon Violation Of Statutory Standards, Joseph H. Ballway Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Regulatory enactments controlling production and distribution can give rise in several different ways to civil liability on behalf of persons injured by non-conforming merchandise. For instance, if a statute codifies existing common-law rules of negligence, its effect is merely to place the weight of legislative authority behind ordinary negligence principles. Since an injured party's recovery under such a provision still depends largely upon his proving in the traditional manner that a defendant failed to exercise due care, this kind of statute merits no further discussion. On the other hand, if particular legislation expressly states that a violator may be subjected …

Renegotiation Of War Contracts, Charles W. Steadman

Michigan Law Review

The limitation of war profits to fair and reasonable levels and the purchase of war goods at fair prices are essential to the successful prosecution of the war. These problems come as a part of war and must be solved just as surely as tactical problems in battle. Exorbitant profits and prices spell defeat to any nation, for they point the way to inflation and economic collapse. In modern war the difference between defeat and victory lies ultimately in the economic strength of the countries involved. The lessons of history have shown us that no nation can achieve and maintain …