Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
Assessing The Insurance Role Of Tort Liability After Calabresi, Joni Hersch, W. Kip Viscusi
Assessing The Insurance Role Of Tort Liability After Calabresi, Joni Hersch, W. Kip Viscusi
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Calabresi’s theory of tort liability (1961) as a risk distribution mechanism established insurance as an objective of tort liability. Calabresi’s risk-spreading concept of tort has provided the impetus for much of the subsequent development of tort liability doctrine, including risk-utility analysis and strict liability. Calabresi’s analysis remains a powerful basis for modern tort liability. However, high transactions costs, correlated risks, catastrophic losses, mass toxic torts, shifts in liability rules over time, noneconomic damages, and punitive damages affect the functioning of tort liability as an insurance mechanism. Despite some limitations of tort liability as insurance, tort compensation serves both a compensatory …
Law And Economics As A Pillar Of Legal Education, W. Kip Viscusi, Joni Hersch
Law And Economics As A Pillar Of Legal Education, W. Kip Viscusi, Joni Hersch
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This paper reports the distribution of doctoral degrees in economics and in other fields among faculy at the 26 hghest-ranked law schools. Almost one-third of professors at the top 13 law schools have a Ph.D. degree, with 9 % having a Ph.D. in economics. Law school rank is hghly correlated with the share of faculy holding a Ph.D. in economics and is less correlated with the share offaculy with other doctoral degrees. Law and economics is a major area of legal scholarsh based on citations in the law literature and other impact rankings. In recognition of the increased importance of …
Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, Brian T. Fitzpatrick
Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, Brian T. Fitzpatrick
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Class action lawyers are some of the most frequently derided players in our system of civil litigation. It is often asserted that class action lawyers take too much from class judgments as fees, that class actions are little more than a device for the lawyers to enrich themselves at the expense of the class. In this Article, I argue that some of this criticism of class action lawyers is misguided. In particular, I perform a normative examination of fee percentages in class action litigation using the social-welfarist utilitarian account of litigation known as deterrence-insurance theory. I argue that in perhaps …