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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
Duress As Rent-Seeking, Mark Seidenfeld, Murat C. Mungan
Duress As Rent-Seeking, Mark Seidenfeld, Murat C. Mungan
Scholarly Publications
No abstract provided.
Adjudicating Corporate Auctions, Jay B. Kesten
Adjudicating Corporate Auctions, Jay B. Kesten
Scholarly Publications
In light of recent developments in auction theory, this Article re-examines Delaware corporate law governing directors' actions when structuring the sale of a corporation. A foundational doctrine of Delaware law is that when the board of directors resolves to sell a corporation, it must obtain the highest price reasonably available. Auction theory posits that, in certain circumstances germane to corporate takeovers, revenues can be maximized through the use of ex ante precommitments to the rules of the auction. Delaware law, however, does not fully endorse directors' ability to make such precommitments, primarily out of the concern that the board will …
Political Uncertainty And The Market For Ipos, Jay B. Kesten, Murat C. Mungan
Political Uncertainty And The Market For Ipos, Jay B. Kesten, Murat C. Mungan
Scholarly Publications
No abstract provided.
Investments To Make Threats Credible, Rent-Seeking, And Duress, Mark Seidenfeld, Murat C. Mungan
Investments To Make Threats Credible, Rent-Seeking, And Duress, Mark Seidenfeld, Murat C. Mungan
Scholarly Publications
Existing literature on the contract law doctrine of duress identifies a number of tests to determine conditions under which a contract can be voided. No article provides a specific and formal economic analysis on the link between rent-seeking and the conditions under which allowing a defense of duress is wealth enhancing. This article shows that commitments made as a result of ex ante investments by threatening parties made solely for the purpose of transferring, rather than creating wealth, ought to be voidable. We discuss cases in which a test based on rent-seeking enhances efficiency where previously proposed tests do not.
Private Ordering Under Threat Of Regulation, Jake Linford
Private Ordering Under Threat Of Regulation, Jake Linford
Scholarly Publications
No abstract provided.