Law Commons^™

Fundraising And Optimal Policy Rules, Murat C. Mungan, Bariş K. Yörük

Scholarly Publications

This paper develops a simple spatial model of fundraising, in which charities select a target population to solicit donations. First, we show that in a competitive charity market without any intervention, the number of charities in the market and/or the overall net funds raised by charities may be sub-optimal. Next, we analyze whether a social planner can prevent such shortcomings and show that a regulatory mechanism can be designed to achieve socially desirable outcomes. In contrast to the previous literature, our model does not necessarily produce monopoly as the optimal market structure. We show that if fixed costs associated with …

Re-Focusing On Philanthropy: Revising And Re-Orienting The Standard Model, Rob Atkinson

Scholarly Publications

This paper undertakes a detailed analysis of today's standard theory of the philanthropic sector to provide a new model that is both more accurate in its details and more comprehensive in its scope. The standard theory sees the philanthropic sector as subordinate and supplementary to our capitalist market economy and liberal democratic polity. That approach has a fundamental short-coming: its explanation of both the state and philanthropy as adjuncts to the market fails to appreciate the ways in which all three sectors support and supplement each other. The standard model's primary focus on the market ignores how the demands that …

Don't Say You're Sorry Unless You Mean It: Pricing Apologies To Achieve Credibility, Murat C. Mungan

Scholarly Publications

Remorse and apologies by offenders have not been rigorously analyzed in the law and economics literature. This is perhaps because apologies are regarded as ’cheap talk’ and are deemed to be non-informative of an individual’s conscious state. In this paper, I develop a formal framework in which one can analyze remorse and apologies. I argue that legal procedures can be designed to price apologies, such that only truly remorseful individuals apologize. Hence, apologies would not be mere ’cheap talk’ and could send correct signals regarding an offender’s true conscious state, making them credible. This will lead victims, upon receiving apologies, …

High-Powered (Mis)Incentives And Venture-Capital Contractors, Manuel A. Utset

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.

Economics Of The Independent Invention Defense Under Incomplete Information, Murat C. Mungan

Scholarly Publications

Patents lead to ex post deadweight loss arising from a noncompetitive market structure for the invention. Many have argued that introducing independent invention as a defense (IID) to patent infringement can increase social welfare by decreasing such deadweight loss at the price of a modest decrease in the number of inventions. This paper considers the effects of IID in a setting where R&D firms have incomplete information about their rivals. Four main results follow under incomplete information: (i) fewer things are invented under an IID regime; (ii) IID’s effects on welfare are ambiguous; (iii) IID is more likely to increase …

The Law And Economics Of Fluctuating Criminal Tendencies And Incapacitation, Murat C. Mungan

Scholarly Publications

Economic analyses of criminal law are frequently and heavily criticized for being unable to explain many criminal law rules and doctrines people find intuitively just. Existing economic models cannot properly explain, for instance, why criminal law distinguishes between (1) repeat offenders and first-time offenders, (2) murder and voluntary manslaughter, and (3) remorseful and non-remorseful offenders.

This Article proposes a richer economic theory of crime that captures the rationales behind these practices and potentially behind many other important criminal law principles and doctrines. Unlike an overwhelming majority of previous economic analyses, my theory accounts not only for the deterrent effect of …