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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Law
Employee Say-On-Pay: Monitoring And Legitimizing Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee
Employee Say-On-Pay: Monitoring And Legitimizing Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee
Robert Rhee
This Article proposes the adoption of employee say-on-pay in corporate governance. The board would benefit from an advisory vote of employees on executive compensation. This proposal is based on two considerations: firstly, the benefits of better monitoring and reduced agency cost in corporate governance; secondly, the link between executive compensation and income inequity and wealth disparity in the broader economy. If adopted, shareholders and employees would monitor executive performance and pay at different levels. Shareholders through the market mechanism can only monitor at the level of public disclosures and share price. Employees can leverage private information. Non-executive managers in particular …
A Financial Economic Theory Of Punitive Damages, Robert J. Rhee
A Financial Economic Theory Of Punitive Damages, Robert J. Rhee
Robert Rhee
This Article provides a financial economic theory of punitive damages. The core problem, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, is not the systemic amount of punitive damages in the tort system; rather, it is the risk of outlier outcomes. Low frequency, high severity awards are unpredictable, cause financial distress, and beget social cost. By focusing only on offsetting escaped liability, the standard law and economics theory fails to account for the core problem of variance. This Article provides a risk arbitrage analysis of the relationship between variance, litigation valuation, and optimal deterrence. Starting with settlement …
Reflections On The Financial Crisis, Robert J. Rhee
Bonding Limited Liability, Robert J. Rhee
Bonding Limited Liability, Robert J. Rhee
Robert Rhee
Limited liability is considered a “birthright” of corporations. The concept is entrenched in legal theory, and it is a fixed reality of the political economy. But it remains controversial. Scholarly debate has been engaged in absolute terms of defending the rule or advocating its abrogation. Though compelling, these polar positions, often expressed in abstract arguments, are associated with disquieting effects. Without limited liability, efficiency may be severely compromised. With it, involuntary tort creditors bear some of the cost of an enterprise. Most other proposals for reforming limited liability have been incremental, such as modifying veil piercing. However, neither absolutism nor …
A Production Theory Of Pure Economic Loss, Robert J. Rhee
A Production Theory Of Pure Economic Loss, Robert J. Rhee
Robert Rhee
Although the pure economic loss rule has been remarkably durable in the common law, it suffers from a theoretical deficit. The rule has not been properly framed within the broader context of Anglo-American political economy. Any theory must recognize that the rule fundamentally deals with business risk and economic organization. Two conceptions of risk are important: risk to economic assets essential to the production function (loss of a factor of production), and risk to outcomes (loss of production). This Article proposes a production theory of the pure economic loss rule, which is rooted in the neoclassical economic understanding of the …
Bonding Limited Liability, Robert J. Rhee
Bonding Limited Liability, Robert J. Rhee
Robert Rhee
Limited liability is considered a “birthright” of corporations. The concept is entrenched in legal theory, and it is a fixed reality of the political economy. But it remains controversial. Scholarly debate has been engaged in absolute terms of defending the rule or advocating its abrogation. Though compelling, these polar positions, often expressed in abstract arguments, are associated with disquieting effects. Without limited liability, efficiency may be severely compromised. With it, involuntary tort creditors bear some of the cost of an enterprise. Most other proposals for reforming limited liability have been incremental, such as modifying veil piercing. However, neither absolutism nor …