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Full-Text Articles in Law
Externalities And The Common Owner, Madison Condon
Externalities And The Common Owner, Madison Condon
Faculty Scholarship
Due to the embrace of modern portfolio theory, most of the stock market is controlled by institutional investors holding broadly diversified economy-mirroring portfolios. Recent scholarship has revealed the anti-competitive incentives that arise when a firm’s largest shareholders own similarly sized stakes in the firm’s industry competitors. This Article expands the consideration of the effects of common ownership from the industry level to the market-portfolio level, and argues that diversified investors should rationally be motivated to internalize intra-portfolio negative externalities. This portfolio perspective can explain the increasing climate change related activism of institutional investors, who have applied coordinated shareholder power to …
Bargaining Failure And Failure To Bargain, Michael J. Meurer
Bargaining Failure And Failure To Bargain, Michael J. Meurer
Faculty Scholarship
In this talk I want to do four things. First, I’m going to present a motivating example, and second I will discuss what causes IP litigation. I want to distinguish between bargaining failure and failure to bargain ex ante. This is the descriptive portion of my project, and the message is really pretty simple. In law and economics, we think a lot about why people who have a dispute, who sit cross from each other at a table, fail to do the efficient thing, which is to stay out of the courtroom and avoid incurring litigation costs. Law and economics …
The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions Of The Regulatory State, Robert B. Ahdieh
The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions Of The Regulatory State, Robert B. Ahdieh
Faculty Scholarship
We live in a coordination economy. As one surveys the myriad challenges of modern social and economic life, an ever increasing proportion is defined not by the need to reconcile competing interests, but by the challenge of getting everyone on the same page. Conflict is not absent in these settings. It is not, however, the determinative factor in shaping our behaviors and resulting interactions. That essential ingredient, instead, is coordination.
Such coordination is commonly understood as the function of the market. As it turns out, however, optimal coordination will not always emerge, as if led “by an invisible hand.” Even …