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Full-Text Articles in Law
The First Amendment, Common Carriers, And Public Accommodations: Net Neutrality, Digital Platforms, And Privacy, Christopher S. Yoo
The First Amendment, Common Carriers, And Public Accommodations: Net Neutrality, Digital Platforms, And Privacy, Christopher S. Yoo
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Recent prominent judicial opinions have assumed that common carriers have few to no First Amendment rights and that calling an actor a common carrier or public accommodation could justify limiting its right to exclude and mandating that it provide nondiscriminatory access. A review of the history reveals that the underlying law is richer than these simple statements would suggest. The principles for determining what constitutes a common carrier or a public accommodation and the level of First Amendment protection both turn on whether the actor holds itself out as serving all members of the public or whether it asserts editorial …
Steiner V. Utah: Designing A Constitutional Remedy, Michael S. Knoll, Ruth Mason
Steiner V. Utah: Designing A Constitutional Remedy, Michael S. Knoll, Ruth Mason
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In an earlier article, we argued that the Utah Supreme Court failed to follow and correctly apply clear U.S. Supreme Court precedent in Steiner v. Utah when the Utah high court held that an internally inconsistent and discriminatory state tax regime did not violate the dormant commerce clause. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court recently declined certiorari in Steiner, but the issue is unlikely to go away. Not every state high court will defy the U.S. Supreme Court by refusing to apply the dormant commerce clause, and so the Court will sooner or later likely find itself facing conflicting interpretations of …
Dual Residents: A Sur-Reply To Zelinsky, Michael S. Knoll, Ruth Mason
Dual Residents: A Sur-Reply To Zelinsky, Michael S. Knoll, Ruth Mason
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In this article, we respond to Professor Zelinsky’s criticism of our arguments regarding the constitutionality of New York’s tax residence rule. We argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in Wynne requires reconsideration of the New York Court of Appeal’s decision in Tamagni.
Wynne: It's Not About Double Taxation, Michael S. Knoll, Ruth Mason
Wynne: It's Not About Double Taxation, Michael S. Knoll, Ruth Mason
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This Article discusses Wynne v. Comptroller, a dormant Commerce Clause case against Maryland pending before the Supreme Court. We use economic analysis to rebut Maryland’s claim that its tax regime does not discriminate against interstate commerce. We also argue that the parties’ framing of the central issue in the case as whether the Constitution requires states to relieve double taxation draws focus away from the discrimination question, and therefore could undermine the Wynnes’ case and lead to unjustified narrowing of the dormant Commerce Clause. We also show how our approach to tax discrimination resolves many of the issues that …
The Law And Economics Of Stop-And-Frisk, David S. Abrams
The Law And Economics Of Stop-And-Frisk, David S. Abrams
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The relevant economic and legal research relating to police use of stop-and-frisk has largely been distinct. There is much to be gained by taking an interdisciplinary approach. This Essay emphasizes some of the challenges faced by those seeking to evaluate the efficacy and legality of stop-and-frisk, and suggests some ways forward and areas of exploration for future research.
In Search Of "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism", Matthew Lindsay
In Search Of "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism", Matthew Lindsay
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This article is a response to Professor Jed Shugerman’s Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review, HARVARD LAW REVIEW (2010). Professor Shugerman argues that the widespread adoption of judicial elections in the 1850’s and the embrace by the first generation of elected judges of countermajoritarian rationales for judicial review helped to effect a transition from the active, industry-building state of the early nineteenth century to the "laissez-faire constitutionalism" of the Lochner era. This response argues that Professor Shugerman overstates the causal relationship between the elected judiciary’s robust constitutional defense of "vested rights" and the iconic, if …
Architectural Censorship And The Fcc, Christopher S. Yoo
Architectural Censorship And The Fcc, Christopher S. Yoo
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Most First Amendment analyses of U.S. media policy have focused predominantly on “behavioral” regulation, which either prohibits the transmission of disfavored content (such as indecent programming) or mandates the dissemination of preferred content (such as children’s educational programming and political speech). In so doing, commentators have largely overlooked how program content is also affected by “structural” regulation, which focuses primarily on increasing the economic competitiveness of media industries. In this Article, Professor Christopher Yoo employs economic analysis to demonstrate how structural regulation can constitute a form of “architectural censorship” that has the unintended consequence of reducing the quantity, quality, and …
Assessing The Advocacy Of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response To Philip Harter, Cary Coglianese
Assessing The Advocacy Of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response To Philip Harter, Cary Coglianese
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For many years, advocates of negotiated rulemaking have advanced enthusiastic claims about how negotiated rulemaking would reduce litigation and shorten the rulemaking process. In an earlier study, I tested these claims systematically by assessing the effectiveness of negotiated rulemaking against existing rulemaking processes. I found that negotiated rulemaking neither saves time nor reduces litigation. Recently, Philip Harter, a longtime advocate of negotiated rulemaking, has criticized my study and asserted that negotiated rulemaking has succeeded remarkably in achieving its goals. Harter criticized the way I measured the length of the rulemaking process, claimed that I failed to appreciate differences in litigation, …