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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Anticompetitive Effect Of Passive Investment, David Gilo
The Anticompetitive Effect Of Passive Investment, David Gilo
Michigan Law Review
There are many cases in which a firm passively invests in its competitor. For example, Microsoft passively invested in $150 million worth of the nonvoting stock of Apple, its historic rival in the operating systems market. Also, in November 1998, Northwest Airlines, the nation's fourth-largest airline, purchased 14% of the common stock of Continental Airlines Inc., the nation's fifth-largest (and fastest growing) airline. Northwest competes with Continental on seven routes, serving 3.6 million passengers per year. In another example, TCI, the nation's largest cable operator, became a passive investor with a 9% stake (which can be increased, under the terms …
Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, And The Challenge Of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, Peter J. Hammer
Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, And The Challenge Of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, Peter J. Hammer
Michigan Law Review
Should antitrust law ever sanction the accumulation of market power or permit other restraints of trade if such conduct would increase social welfare? This is the challenge raised by intramarket second- best tradeoffs. The lesson of second-best analysis is that one market failure can sometimes counteract the effects of another market failure. In the presence of multiple market failures, it is conceivable that mergers or other restraints traditionally viewed as anticompetitive may be welfare-enhancing. A social planner, given the mandate of maximizing total welfare, would permit such restraints. Could an antitrust judge come to the same result under a defensible …
Antitrust's Protected Classes, Herbert Hovenkamp
Antitrust's Protected Classes, Herbert Hovenkamp
Michigan Law Review
For purposes of argument, this essay assumes that efficiency ought to be the exclusive goal of antitrust enforcement. That premise is controversial. Nonetheless, several economic and legal theorists, primarily among the Chicago School of economics and antitrust scholarship, have developed an Optimal Deterrence Model based on this assumption. The Model is designed to achieve the optimum, or ideal, amount of antitrust enforcement. The Model's originators generally believe that there is too much antitrust enforcement, particularly enforcement initiated by private plaintiffs. I intend to show that, even if efficiency is the only antitrust policy goal, a broader array of lawsuits should …
Hawley: The New Deal And The Monopoly Problem, Arthur D. Austin
Hawley: The New Deal And The Monopoly Problem, Arthur D. Austin
Michigan Law Review
A Review of The New Deal and the Monopoly Problem By E. W. Hawley
Antitrust And The Consumer Interest, Kenneth S. Carlston, James M. Treece
Antitrust And The Consumer Interest, Kenneth S. Carlston, James M. Treece
Michigan Law Review
Public control of business in the United States has proceeded, in most sectors of the economy, on the assumption that free, open competition in the market should be the primary regulator. It is felt that consumer welfare will be maximized by such an organization of the economy. Courts, governmental agencies, and, to a certain extent, private agencies have performed the role of ensuring that free markets are not displaced by other, less desirable alternatives.
Boycotts And Restrictive Marketing Arrangements, Richard M. Buxbaum
Boycotts And Restrictive Marketing Arrangements, Richard M. Buxbaum
Michigan Law Review
It is currently a common if still relatively unheralded practice for a "fired" dealer to bring an antitrust action against his former manufacturer-supplier (and perhaps other dealers), alleging that his termination was the result of a boycott. Boycotts-collective efforts to obtain the exclusion of a party from a market-are illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Thus, questions concerning the justification for the boycott or the significance of the offender's market position do not arise.
Oppenheim: Unfair Trade Practices, Cases And Comments, Glen E. Weston
Oppenheim: Unfair Trade Practices, Cases And Comments, Glen E. Weston
Michigan Law Review
A Review of Unfair Trade Practices, Cases and Comments by S. Chesterfield Oppenheim
The Relativity Of Economic Evidence In Merger Cases-Emerging Decisions Force The Issue, Betty Bock
The Relativity Of Economic Evidence In Merger Cases-Emerging Decisions Force The Issue, Betty Bock
Michigan Law Review
The following discussion explores the interaction between law and economics as these two disciplines relate to the issues which arise under section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended in 1950, and examines the correlative problems implicit in the working arrangements between lawyers and economists when they are asked to counsel an enforcement agency or an acquiring or acquired company concerning the potential competitive consequences of a merger.
Antitrust Policy In Distribution, Kendall B. Debevoise
Antitrust Policy In Distribution, Kendall B. Debevoise
Michigan Law Review
The American genius lies quite as much in distribution as in manufacturing. Other peoples have demonstrated equal or greater creative ability in many fields. And it is debatable whether their talents are any less at mass production given adequate economic demand. But they have nowhere shown the American genius for distribution. It is axiomatic that if you manufacture in Detroit and your potential customer lives in New York, you need mutual friends. We seem to have figured out better ways to provide better friends for this purpose than any other nation.
But manufacturing came first. Someone had to build a …
Regulation Of Business - Proof Of Seller's Costs In Robinson-Patman Act Buyer Proceedings, Arthur M. Wisehart S.Ed.
Regulation Of Business - Proof Of Seller's Costs In Robinson-Patman Act Buyer Proceedings, Arthur M. Wisehart S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review
The purposes of this comment are to analyze the holding of the Court in the Automatic Canteen case and to relate the language of the opinion to the more general problem of defining the extent of buyer responsibility under section 2(f). As a preliminary matter, however, it is necessary to examine the pertinent statutory provisions. Section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it unlawful for buyers in interstate commerce" ... knowingly to induce or receive a · discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section." In other words, it prohibits buyers from knowingly inducing or receiving the benefit of …
Hayes: The Historical Evolution Of Modern Nationalism., Michigan Law Review
Hayes: The Historical Evolution Of Modern Nationalism., Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
A Review of THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF MODERN NATIONALISM. By Carlton J. H. Hayes.