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Law and Economics

SelectedWorks

Selected Works

2006

Law and Economics

Articles 1 - 7 of 7

Full-Text Articles in Law

Partial Ban On Plea Bargains, Oren Gazal Feb 2006

Partial Ban On Plea Bargains, Oren Gazal

Oren Gazal-Ayal

The influence of the plea bargaining system on innocent defendants is fiercely debated. Many scholars call for a ban on plea bargaining, arguing that the practice coerces innocent defendants to plead guilty. Proponents of plea bargaining respond that even an innocent defendant is better off when he choose to plea bargain in order to assure a lenient result, if he concludes that the risk of wrongful trial conviction is too high. They claim that since plea bargaining is only an option, it cannot harm the defendant whether he is guilty or innocent. This paper argues that the both supporters and …


Current Economic Issues In Securities Litigation, Scott D. Hakala Jan 2006

Current Economic Issues In Securities Litigation, Scott D. Hakala

Scott D Hakala

This paper discusses the economic framework for determining economic loss in securities litigation and the then current case law. This includes discussions regarding assessing materiality and reliance, the use of event study analyses to identify loss causationg and the interaction of legal and economic principles.


Plea Bargains Only For The Guilty, Oren Bar-Gill, Oren Gazal Jan 2006

Plea Bargains Only For The Guilty, Oren Bar-Gill, Oren Gazal

Oren Gazal-Ayal

A major concern with plea bargains is that innocent defendants will be induced to plead guilty. This paper argues that the law can address this concern by providing prosecutors with incentives to select cases in which the probability of guilt is high. By restricting the permissible sentence reduction in a plea bargain the law can preclude plea bargains in cases where the probability of conviction is low (L cases). The prosecutor will therefore be forced to – (1) select fewer L cases and proceed to trial with these cases; or (2) select more cases with a higher probability of conviction …


Numerus Clausus: An Economic Perspective, Wei Zhang Jan 2006

Numerus Clausus: An Economic Perspective, Wei Zhang

Wei Zhang

No abstract provided.


Divorce Laws And The Structure Of The American Family, Stéphane Mechoulan Jan 2006

Divorce Laws And The Structure Of The American Family, Stéphane Mechoulan

Stéphane Mechoulan

No abstract provided.


The Policy-Making Process Of Supreme People Court: Power Strategy And Information Selection(最高法院公共政策的运作:权力策略与信息选择), Meng Hou Jan 2006

The Policy-Making Process Of Supreme People Court: Power Strategy And Information Selection(最高法院公共政策的运作:权力策略与信息选择), Meng Hou

Hou Meng

No abstract provided.


Retos Y Proyecciones Del Derecho Mercantil Frente A La Globalización. Un Intento De Aproximación Filosófica, Histórica Y Dogmática, Juan Pablo Pampillo Jan 2006

Retos Y Proyecciones Del Derecho Mercantil Frente A La Globalización. Un Intento De Aproximación Filosófica, Histórica Y Dogmática, Juan Pablo Pampillo

Juan Pablo Pampillo Baliño

No abstract provided.