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Law and Economics

SelectedWorks

Oren Gazal-Ayal

Selected Works

Law and Economics

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Economic Analysis Of Law In North America, Europe And Israel, Oren Gazal-Ayal Jan 2007

Economic Analysis Of Law In North America, Europe And Israel, Oren Gazal-Ayal

Oren Gazal-Ayal

What explains the popularity of law and economics (L&E) in some academic communities and the scarcity of such scholarship in others? Many explanations have been given for the centrality of economic analysis in American legal thought and its marginality in Europe. This article examines what drives scholars to select L&E as a topic for research. It does so by implementing the methodology of many papers in the field – by assuming that regulation and incentives matter. Legal scholars face very different academic incentives in different parts of the world. In some countries, the academic standards for appointment, promotion and tenure …


Partial Ban On Plea Bargains, Oren Gazal Feb 2006

Partial Ban On Plea Bargains, Oren Gazal

Oren Gazal-Ayal

The influence of the plea bargaining system on innocent defendants is fiercely debated. Many scholars call for a ban on plea bargaining, arguing that the practice coerces innocent defendants to plead guilty. Proponents of plea bargaining respond that even an innocent defendant is better off when he choose to plea bargain in order to assure a lenient result, if he concludes that the risk of wrongful trial conviction is too high. They claim that since plea bargaining is only an option, it cannot harm the defendant whether he is guilty or innocent. This paper argues that the both supporters and …


Plea Bargains Only For The Guilty, Oren Bar-Gill, Oren Gazal Jan 2006

Plea Bargains Only For The Guilty, Oren Bar-Gill, Oren Gazal

Oren Gazal-Ayal

A major concern with plea bargains is that innocent defendants will be induced to plead guilty. This paper argues that the law can address this concern by providing prosecutors with incentives to select cases in which the probability of guilt is high. By restricting the permissible sentence reduction in a plea bargain the law can preclude plea bargains in cases where the probability of conviction is low (L cases). The prosecutor will therefore be forced to – (1) select fewer L cases and proceed to trial with these cases; or (2) select more cases with a higher probability of conviction …