Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
- Keyword
-
- SSRN (8)
- Law and economics (5)
- Financial crisis (3)
- Financial regulation (3)
- Behavioral economics (2)
-
- Economics (2)
- Leverage (2)
- Markets (2)
- Regulation (2)
- Strict liability (2)
- WTO (2)
- 501(c)(3) (1)
- Agency Cost (1)
- Agency costs (1)
- Agency design (1)
- Agency policy (1)
- American Economic Review (1)
- American rule (1)
- Antitrust (1)
- Antitrust enforcement (1)
- Apple Store solution (1)
- Avatar-DTI (1)
- Background risks (1)
- Bank of America (1)
- Banking crisis (1)
- Bankruptcy Cost (1)
- Benefit cost analysis (BCA) (1)
- Boundaries (1)
- Brussels effect (1)
- Bylaw (1)
Articles 1 - 30 of 45
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Use And Abuse Of Labor's Capital, David H. Webber
The Use And Abuse Of Labor's Capital, David H. Webber
Faculty Scholarship
The recent financial crisis has jeopardized the retirement savings of twenty-seven million Americans who depend on public pension funds, leading to cuts in benefits, increased employee contributions, job losses, and the rollback of legal rights like collective bargaining. This Article examines ways in which public pension funds invest against the economic interests of their own participants and beneficiaries, and the legal implications of these investments. In particular, the Article focuses on the use of public pensions to fund privatization of public employee jobs. Under the ascendant — and flawed — interpretation of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, public pension trustees …
Nonprofit Executive Pay As An Agency Problem: Evidence From U.S. Colleges And Universities, David I. Walker, Brian D. Galle
Nonprofit Executive Pay As An Agency Problem: Evidence From U.S. Colleges And Universities, David I. Walker, Brian D. Galle
Faculty Scholarship
We analyze the determinants of the compensation of private college and university presidents from 1999 through 2007. We find that the fraction of institutional revenue derived from current donations is negatively associated with compensation and that presidents of religiously-affiliated institutions receive lower levels of compensation. Looking at the determinants of contributions, we find a negative association between presidential pay and subsequent donations. We interpret these results as consistent with the hypotheses that donors to nonprofits are sensitive to executive pay and that stakeholder outrage plays a role in constraining that pay. We discuss the implications of these findings for the …
Which Patent Systems Are Better For Inventors?, James Bessen, Grid Thoma
Which Patent Systems Are Better For Inventors?, James Bessen, Grid Thoma
Faculty Scholarship
International comparisons of patent systems are essential to harmonization treaties and to analyze economic growth. Yet these comparisons often rely on little but conventional wisdom. This paper develops an empirical method to compare the economic strength and quality of patent systems by using renewal analysis of matched patents in different countries (same patent family). Comparing patents on the same inventions filed at the EPO for Germany and in the US, we find that the German patents generate substantially greater market power than their US equivalents, especially for small inventors. Also, the average US patent has relatively lower economic value (“quality”).
Paternalism, Public Health, And Behavioral Economics: A Problematic Combination, Wendy K. Mariner
Paternalism, Public Health, And Behavioral Economics: A Problematic Combination, Wendy K. Mariner
Faculty Scholarship
Some critiques of public health regulations assume that measures directed at industry should be considered paternalistic whenever they limit any consumer choices. Given the presumption against paternalistic measures, this conception of paternalism puts government proposals to regulate industry to the same stringent proof as clearly paternalist proposals to directly regulate individuals for their own benefit. The result is to discourage regulating industry in ways that protect the public from harm and instead to encourage regulating individuals for their own good -- quite the opposite of what one would expect from a rejection of paternalism. Arguments favoring "soft paternalism" to justify …
Nuisance, Keith N. Hylton
Nuisance, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
This entry sets out the law and the economic theory of nuisance. Nuisance law serves a regulatory function: it induces actors to choose the socially preferred level of an activity by imposing liability when the externalized costs of the activity are substantially greater than the externalized benefits or not reciprocal to other background external costs. Proximate cause doctrine plays a role in supplementing nuisance law.
Sales Suppression As A Service (Ssaas) & The Apple Store Solution, Richard Thompson Ainsworth
Sales Suppression As A Service (Ssaas) & The Apple Store Solution, Richard Thompson Ainsworth
Faculty Scholarship
The problem of sales suppression fraud is estimated to cost state and local governments $20 billion annually ($2 billion in New York restaurants alone). Modern sales suppression (skimming) is carried out with technology (Zappers and Phantom-ware). Nine undercover sting operations in and around Manhattan and the Bronx by investigators working for New York’s Department of Taxation and Finance (NY-DT&F) have identified the SSaaS variant of modern skimming.
A striking example of SSaaS may be unfolding in the $1 million sales suppression case against Congressman Michael Grimm (R-NY). It is alleged that Grimm skimmed sales from his Healthalicious restaurant in Manhattan, …
Innovation And Optimal Punishment, With Antitrust Applications, Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin
Innovation And Optimal Punishment, With Antitrust Applications, Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin
Faculty Scholarship
This article modifies the optimal punishment analysis by incorporating investment incentives with external benefits. In the models examined, the recommendation that the optimal penalty should internalize the marginal social harm is no longer valid. We focus on antitrust applications. In light of the benefits from innovation, the optimal policy will punish monopolizing firms more leniently than suggested in the standard static model. It may be optimal not to punish the monopolizing firm at all, or to reward the firm rather than punish it. We examine the precise balance between penalty and reward in the optimal punishment scheme.
Transfer Pricing: Un Practical Manual – China, Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Andrew Shact
Transfer Pricing: Un Practical Manual – China, Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Andrew Shact
Faculty Scholarship
Any contemporary Chinese transfer pricing assessment needs to consider the United Nation (UN) Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries released in May 2013. In particular, Chapter 10 discusses Country Practices and presents China’s most up to date transfer pricing policy statement.
China is not an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member nor has it formally adopted the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations. Chapter 10 makes it very clear that China is charting a different transfer pricing course in at least nine important areas. China believes that: 1. significant comparability adjustments are …
The Burden Of Deciding For Yourself: The Disutility Caused By Out-Of-Pocket Healthcare Spending, Christopher Robertson, David Yokum
The Burden Of Deciding For Yourself: The Disutility Caused By Out-Of-Pocket Healthcare Spending, Christopher Robertson, David Yokum
Faculty Scholarship
As part of a larger "consumer-directed healthcare movement," cost-sharing mechanisms, such as copays and deductibles, cause patients to pay out of pocket for a portion of the costs of the healthcare they consume. Cost sharing is intended to reduce costs by changing consumption behavior, and it has been shown to be an effective though incomplete solution to the problem of unsustainable cost growth. It is controversial nonetheless. This Essay distinguishes three different normative problems with cost sharing (including underinsurance, deterrence of high-value care, and a tax on sickness), which can all be fixed through more precision in the design of …
Law And Project Finance, Frederick Tung, Krishnamurthy Subramanian
Law And Project Finance, Frederick Tung, Krishnamurthy Subramanian
Faculty Scholarship
We investigate Project Finance as a private response to inefficiencies created by weak legal protection of outside investors. We offer a new illustration that law matters by demonstrating that for large investment projects, Project Finance provides a contractual and organizational substitute for investor protection laws. Project Finance accomplishes this by making cash flows verifiable through two mechanisms: (i) contractual arrangements made possible by structuring the project within a single, discrete entity legally separate from the sponsor; and (ii) private enforcement of these contracts through a network of project accounts that ensures lender control of project cash flows. Comparing bank loans …
Innovation And Incarceration: An Economic Analysis Of Criminal Intellectual Property Law, Christopher Buccafusco, Jonathan S. Masur
Innovation And Incarceration: An Economic Analysis Of Criminal Intellectual Property Law, Christopher Buccafusco, Jonathan S. Masur
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Failed Promise Of User Fees: Empirical Evidence From The United States Patent And Trademark Office, Michael D. Frakes, Melissa F. Wasserman
The Failed Promise Of User Fees: Empirical Evidence From The United States Patent And Trademark Office, Michael D. Frakes, Melissa F. Wasserman
Faculty Scholarship
In an attempt to shed light on the impact of user-fee financing structures on the behavior of administrative agencies, we explore the relationship between the funding structure of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and its examination practices. We suggest that the PTO’s reliance on prior grantees to subsidize current applicants exposes the Agency to a risk that its obligatory costs will surpass incoming fee collections. When such risks materialize, we hypothesize, and thereafter document, that the PTO will restore financial balance by extending preferential examination treatment—i.e., higher granting propensities and/or shorter wait times—to some technologies over others.
For-Profit Public Enforcement, Margaret H. Lemos, Max Minzner
For-Profit Public Enforcement, Margaret H. Lemos, Max Minzner
Faculty Scholarship
This Article investigates an important yet undertheorized phenomenon: financial incentives in public enforcement. Each year, public enforcers assess billions of dollars in penalties and other financial sanctions for violations of state and federal law. Why? If the awards in question were the result of private lawsuits, the answer would be obvious. We expect that private enforcers—the victims of law violations and their fee-seeking attorneys—will attempt to maximize financial recoveries. Record recoveries come as no surprise in private class actions, for example. But dollar signs are harder to explain in the context of public enforcement. Unlike private attorneys, public enforcers are …
How To Improve The Financial Architecture And Its Resilience, Dirk Helbing, Eve Mitleton-Kelly, Jean-Philippe Bouchaud, Fabio Caccioli, J. Doyne Farmer, Steve Keen, Katharina Pistor, Dennis J. Snower, Olsen Richard, Angelo Ranaldo, Norbert Häring, Edward Fullbrook
How To Improve The Financial Architecture And Its Resilience, Dirk Helbing, Eve Mitleton-Kelly, Jean-Philippe Bouchaud, Fabio Caccioli, J. Doyne Farmer, Steve Keen, Katharina Pistor, Dennis J. Snower, Olsen Richard, Angelo Ranaldo, Norbert Häring, Edward Fullbrook
Faculty Scholarship
This financial resilience survey was circulated on behalf of a working group of the Complexity Council of the World Economic Forum comprised of Prof. Eve Mitleton-Kelly of London School of Economics and Prof. Dirk Helbing at ETH Zurich's Risk Center. It was sent to a few dozens of financial experts with the aim to create an inventory of ideas of how the financial system might be improved and made more resilient. Unconventional ideas were also welcome.
Toward A Regulatory Framework For Third-Party Funding Of Litigation, Keith N. Hylton
Toward A Regulatory Framework For Third-Party Funding Of Litigation, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
Because third-party funding and sales of legal rights are equivalent in terms of their economics, I examine arrangements in which third-party sales of legal rights are permitted today; those arrangements include waiver, subrogation, and settlement agreements. These existing arrangements provide valuable lessons for the appropriate regulatory approach to third-party financing of litigation.
A Unified Framework For Competition Policy And Innovation Policy, Keith N. Hylton
A Unified Framework For Competition Policy And Innovation Policy, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
I describe a model of competition law enforcement that treats competition and innovation policy as the inseparable partners they ought to be. The enforcement authority determines an optimal punishment knowing that if it sets the penalty too high it will reduce firms’ incentives to invest in innovation, and if firms do not invest, new goods and new markets will not be created. The authority therefore moderates the penalty in order to maintain innovation incentives. The implications of this framework for competition policy and for innovation policy are quite different from what is commonly observed today. I discuss implications for competition …
Information And Causation In Tort Law: Generalizing The Learned Hand Test For Causation Cases, Keith N. Hylton
Information And Causation In Tort Law: Generalizing The Learned Hand Test For Causation Cases, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
This paper discusses the economics of causation in tort law, describing precise implications for precautionary incentives when courts are and are not perfectly informed. With precautionary incentives identified, we can ask whether the causation inquiry enhances welfare, and if so under what conditions. Perhaps the most important innovation applies to the Hand Formula. When causation is an issue, the probability of causal intervention should be part of the Hand test, and the generalized Hand test offers a method of distinguishing significant classes of causation cases. I close with implications for the moral significance of causation and for economic analysis of …
Anti-Waste, Michael Pappas
Anti-Waste, Michael Pappas
Faculty Scholarship
It may be a bad idea to waste resources, but is it illegal? Legally speaking, what does “waste” even mean? Though the concept may appear completely subjective, this Article builds a framework for understanding how the law identifies and addresses waste.
Drawing upon property and natural resource doctrines, the Article finds that the law selects from a menu of five specific, and sometimes competing, societal values to define waste. The values are: 1) economic efficiency, 2) human flourishing, 3) concern for future generations, 4) stability and consistency, and 5) ecological concerns. The law recognizes waste in terms of one or …
Value Creation By Business Lawyers In The 21st Century, Ronald J. Gilson
Value Creation By Business Lawyers In The 21st Century, Ronald J. Gilson
Faculty Scholarship
It’s a delight to be here. When I started working on Value Creation by Business Lawyers – or when I was in law school – we could have held today’s meeting in a telephone booth. There was nothing even remotely in the curriculum. Victor Brudney and Marvin Chirlestien’s Corporate Finance book was still in mimeograph form – note the dated technology reference. David Herwitz’s Business Planning book had been around for a while, but it was strictly legal. And that exhausted it. What I take the greatest pleasure from is the fact that a number of years later, enough to …
Selling State Borders, Joseph Blocher
Selling State Borders, Joseph Blocher
Faculty Scholarship
Sovereign territory was bought and sold throughout much of American history, and there are good reasons to think that an interstate market for borders could help solve many contemporary economic and political problems. But no such market currently exists. Why not? And could an interstate market for sovereign territory help simplify border disputes, resolve state budget crises, respond to exogenous shocks like river accretion, and improve democratic responsiveness? Focusing on the sale of borders among American states, this Article offers constitutional, political, and ethical answers to the first question, and a qualified yes to the second.
On The Usefulness Of A Flat Economics To The World Of Faith, Andrew P. Morriss
On The Usefulness Of A Flat Economics To The World Of Faith, Andrew P. Morriss
Faculty Scholarship
Is economics unduly flat? Perhaps, sometimes. But part of the power of economics comes from the parsimony of its approach to human nature. If and when we search for more complex approaches, we will need to understand the tradeoffs involved in choosing between that power and simplicity and the alternatives. Rather than deepening our economics with faith, it may be that we are better off using a relatively flat economics to enrich religious understandings.
Whose Trojan Horse? The Dynamics Of Resistance Against Ifrs, Martin Gelter, Zehra Kavame Eroglu
Whose Trojan Horse? The Dynamics Of Resistance Against Ifrs, Martin Gelter, Zehra Kavame Eroglu
Faculty Scholarship
The introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) has been debated in the United States since at least the accounting scandals of the early 2000s. While publicly traded firms around the world are increasingly switching to IFRS, often because they are required to do so by law or by their stock exchange, the Securities Exchange Com-mission (“SEC”) seems to have become more reticent in recent years. Only foreign issuers have been permitted to use IFRS in the United States since 2007. By contrast, the EU has mandated the use of IFRS in the consolidated financial statements of publicly traded firms …
Exporting Standards: The Externalization Of The Eu's Regulatory Power Via Markets, Anu Bradford
Exporting Standards: The Externalization Of The Eu's Regulatory Power Via Markets, Anu Bradford
Faculty Scholarship
This Article examines the unprecedented and deeply underestimated global power that the EU is exercising through its legal institutions and standards, and how it successfully exports that influence to the rest of the world. Introducing the notion of “the Brussels Effect,” the Article shows how market forces alone are sufficient to convert EU standards into global standards. Without the need to use international institutions or seek other nations’ cooperation, the EU has a strong and growing ability to promulgate regulations that become entrenched in the legal frameworks of developed and developing markets alike, leading to a notable “Europeanization” of many …
The Tax Reform Road Not Taken – Yet, Michael J. Graetz
The Tax Reform Road Not Taken – Yet, Michael J. Graetz
Faculty Scholarship
The United States has traveled a unique tax policy path, avoiding value added taxes (VATs), which have now been adopted by every OECD country and 160 countries worldwide. Moreover, many U.S. consumption tax advocates have insisted on direct personalized taxes that are unlike taxes used anywhere in the world. This article details a tax reform plan that uses revenues from a VAT to substantially reduce and reform our nation’s tax system. The plan would (1) enact a destination-based VAT; (2) use the revenue produced by this VAT to finance an income tax exemption of $100,000 of family income and to …
How International Institutions Evolve, Anu Bradford
How International Institutions Evolve, Anu Bradford
Faculty Scholarship
Economic theory suggests that international institutions cannot simultaneously widen and deepen. There is an inevitable trade-off between the benefits of site and the costs of heterogeneity. Consequently, institutions ought to be either small and deep or, alternatively, large and shallow. Yet in reality, we observe that international institutions embrace new members while concurrently pursuing deeper cooperation. This Article seeks to explain how institutions evolve over time in light of this size/heterogeneity trade-off It examines the strategic responses of members of institutions to heterogeneity costs and identifies two distinct yet related strategies that allow states to pursue gains from cooperation while …
Measuring Benchmark Damages In Antitrust Litigation, Justin Mccrary, Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Measuring Benchmark Damages In Antitrust Litigation, Justin Mccrary, Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Faculty Scholarship
We compare the two dominant approaches to estimation of benchmark damages in antitrust litigation, the forecasting approach and the dummy variable approach. We give conditions under which the two approaches are equivalent and present the results of a small simulation study.
Protecting Reliance, Victor P. Goldberg
Protecting Reliance, Victor P. Goldberg
Faculty Scholarship
Reliance plays a central role in contract law and scholarship. One party relies on the other's promised performance, its statements, or its anticipated entry into a formal agreement. Saying that reliance is important, however, says nothing about what we should do about it. The focus of this Essay is on the many ways that parties choose to protect reliance. The relationship between what parties do and what contract doctrine cares about is tenuous at best. Contract performance takes place over time, and the nature of the parties 'future obligations can be deferred to take into account changing circumstances. Reliance matters …
Irredeemably Inefficient Acts: A Threat To Markets, Firms, And The Fisc, Alex Raskolnikov
Irredeemably Inefficient Acts: A Threat To Markets, Firms, And The Fisc, Alex Raskolnikov
Faculty Scholarship
This Article defines and explores irredeemably inefficient acts – a conceptually distinct and empirically important category of socially undesirable conduct. Though inefficient behavior is, no doubt, pervasive, the standard view holds that inefficient conduct may be converted into efficient behavior by forcing actors to internalize the external harms of their decisions. For some acts, however such conversion is impossible. These acts are not just inefficient forms of otherwise socially beneficial activities – they are not just contingently inefficient. Rather, they are inefficient at their core; they reduce social welfare no matter what the regulator does. These irredeemably inefficient (or just …
Three Discount Windows, Kathryn Judge
Three Discount Windows, Kathryn Judge
Faculty Scholarship
It is widely assumed that the Federal Reserve is the lender of last resort in the United States and that the Fed's discount window is the primary mechanism through which it fulfills this role. Yet, when banks faced liquidity constraints during the 2007-2009 financial cfisis (the Cisis), the discount window played a relatively small role in providing banks much needed liquidity. This is not because banks forewent government-backed liquidity; rather, they sought it elsewhere. First, they increased their reliance on collateralized loans, known as advances, from the Federal Home Loan Bank System, a little-known government-sponsored enterprise that grew in size …
The Economics Of The Restatement And Of The Common Law, Keith N. Hylton
The Economics Of The Restatement And Of The Common Law, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
Perhaps the most optimistic view of the American Law Institute's Restatement project was provided at its inception by Benjamin Cardozo:
When, finally, it goes out under the name and with the sanction of the Institute, after all this testing and retesting, it will be something less than a code and something more than a treatise. It will be invested with unique authority, not to command, but to persuade. It will embody a composite thought and speak a composite voice. Universities and bench and bar will have had a part in its creation. I have great faith in the power of …