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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Cost Of Securities Fraud, Urska Velikonja
The Cost Of Securities Fraud, Urska Velikonja
William & Mary Law Review
Under the dominant account, fraudulent financial reporting by public firms harms the firms' shareholders and, more generally, capital markets. This Article contends that the account is incomplete. In addition to undermining investor confidence, misreporting distorts economic decision making by all firms, both those committing fraud and those not. False information impairs risk assessment by those who provide human or financial capital to fraudulent firms, the firms' suppliers and customers, and thus misdirects capital and labor to subpar projects. Efforts to hide fraud and avoid detection further distort fraudulent firms' business decisions, as well as decisions by their rivals, who mimic …
Cyberfinancing For Economic Justice, Lisa T. Alexander
Cyberfinancing For Economic Justice, Lisa T. Alexander
William & Mary Business Law Review
This Article argues for the socially optimal regulation of online peer-to- peer (P2P) lending and crowdfunding to advance economic justice in the United States. Peer-to-peer lending websites, such as Prosper.com or Kiva.org, facilitate lending transactions between individuals online without the involvement of a traditional bank or microfinance institution. Crowdfunding websites, such as Kickstarter.com, enable individuals to obtain financing from large numbers of contributors at once through an open online request for funds. These web-based transactions, and the intermediary organizations that facilitate them, constitute emerging cyberfinancing markets. These markets connect many individuals at once, across class, race, ethnicity, nationality, space, and …
Congressional Silence And The Statutory Interpretation Game, Paul Stancil
Congressional Silence And The Statutory Interpretation Game, Paul Stancil
William & Mary Law Review
This Article explores the circumstances under which the federal legislative apparatus may be unable to respond to a politically objectionable statutory interpretation from the Supreme Court. The Article builds upon existing economic models of statutory interpretation, incorporating transaction costs into the analysis for the first time. The Article concludes by identifying recent real-world disputes in which transaction costs likely constrained Congress and the President from overriding the Court.