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Full-Text Articles in Law

Integrating Micro And Macro Policy Levers In Response To Financial Crises, Daniel A. Crane, Markus Kitzmuller, Graciela Miralles May 2018

Integrating Micro And Macro Policy Levers In Response To Financial Crises, Daniel A. Crane, Markus Kitzmuller, Graciela Miralles

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

The 2008–09 Global Financial Crisis originated from a poor incentive structure in the asset market derived from subprime mortgages. The ultimate bursting and unwinding of an asset bubble (here highly overvalued real estate prices woven into a complex multilayer network of securitization, so called collateralized debt obligations or CDOs) put enormous stress on the financial system, spreading through the global network economy and ultimately resulting in the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. Economists today agree that the severe economic fallout can be largely attributed to the poor systemic performance of international financial markets. Global macroeconomic imbalances, as well …


The Global Architecture Of Financial Regulatory Taxes, Carlo Garbarino, Giulio Allevato Dec 2015

The Global Architecture Of Financial Regulatory Taxes, Carlo Garbarino, Giulio Allevato

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Article endeavors to broaden the analysis of available policy tools to address the problems created by financial crises and discusses how, in addition to direct regulation, certain tax measures having a regulatory nature may operate to address the so-called “negative externalities” often associated with those crises. There is a negative externality when an economic agent making a decision does not pay the full cost of the decision’s consequences. In such cases, the cost to society as a whole is greater than the cost borne by the individuals creating the economic impact. In practice, negative externalities result in market inefficiencies …


The Meaning Of Green Growth, Michael A. Livermore Sep 2013

The Meaning Of Green Growth, Michael A. Livermore

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

Although the term is still rarely used in the United States, in recent years “green growth” has become part of the lexicon of global environmental policy. Unfortunately, although it is frequently cited as a public policy goal, green growth has remained vague and ill-defined, leading to conflicting interpretations and confusion over the distinction between green growth and related concepts like sustainable development. This paper seeks to clarify the meaning of green growth as a distinct concept, defining a “green growth frontier” of policies that dominate along both environmental and economic dimensions. The green growth agenda can be understood as moving …


Climate Justice, Daniel A. Farber Jan 2012

Climate Justice, Daniel A. Farber

Michigan Law Review

Eric Posner and David Weisbach take the threat of climate change seriously. Their book Climate Change Justice offers policy prescriptions that deserve serious attention. While the authors adopt the framework of conventional welfare economics, they show a willingness to engage with noneconomic perspectives, which softens their conclusions. Although they are right to see a risk that overly aggressive ethical claims could derail international agreement on restricting greenhouse gases, their analysis makes climate justice too marginal to climate policy. The developed world does have a special responsibility for the current climate problem, and we should be willing both to agree to …


Optimal Political Control Of The Bureaucracy, Matthew C. Stephenson Oct 2008

Optimal Political Control Of The Bureaucracy, Matthew C. Stephenson

Michigan Law Review

It is widely believed that insulating an administrative agency from the influence of elected officials, whatever its other benefits orjustifications, reduces the agency's responsiveness to the preferences of political majorities. This Article argues, to the contrary, that a moderate degree of bureaucratic insulation from political control alleviates rather than exacerbates the countermajoritarian problems inherent in bureaucratic policymaking. An elected politician, though responsive to majoritarian preferences, will almost always deviate from the majority in one direction or the other Therefore, even if the average policy position of a given elected official tends to track the policy views of the median voter …


Should We All Be Welfare Economists?, Richard H. Fallon Jr. Feb 2003

Should We All Be Welfare Economists?, Richard H. Fallon Jr.

Michigan Law Review

On what normative foundation should the edifice of law and public policy be built? What are proper grounds for claims of individual right, and how, generally, do those grounds relate to considerations of individual well-being and social welfare? In this Essay, I argue that individual well-being and a related concept of social welfare should be important considerations in the design of legal rules, but not the exclusive ones. When the notion of well-being receives substantive content, the most plausible and attractive definitions all allow a distinction between what will best promote a person's well-being and what that person might rationally …


A Bargaining Analysis Of American Labor Law And The Search For Bargaining Equity And Industrial Peace, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt Dec 1992

A Bargaining Analysis Of American Labor Law And The Search For Bargaining Equity And Industrial Peace, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt

Michigan Law Review

In this article, I present an alternative economic analysis of unions and collective bargaining that utilizes recent advances in labor economics and some simple applications of game theory to address the deficiencies of the traditional monopoly model.

The article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I provide a brief primer on the economic analysis of unions and collective bargaining. I discuss the various possible sources of union wage increases, possible employer responses to union wage demands, and alternative models of the costs of collective bargaining. In Part II, I outline the traditional monopoly theory of unions by combining the …


Derek Bok And The Merger Of Law And Economics, Herbert Hovenkamp Jun 1988

Derek Bok And The Merger Of Law And Economics, Herbert Hovenkamp

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Both the novelty and the uniqueness of the "law and economics" movement of the last fifteen years have been greatly exaggerated. Law and economics has been with us for at least a half century, in nearly every area of private and public law. The most outspoken protagonists of law and economics admit that economics had a presence in antitrust and regulatory policy long before the work of Ronald Coase, Lester Telser, and others inspired its expanded use in areas of private law, such as tort and contract. But even then, some of those who would make such an admission would …


Economic Theory And Environmental Law, Mark Sagoff Jun 1981

Economic Theory And Environmental Law, Mark Sagoff

Michigan Law Review

In Part I of this essay, I argue that environmental legislation, at least during the past twenty years, fails to make economic "common sense," that is, it fails to maximize the satisfaction of consumer demand over the long run. Laws like the Endangered Species Act flout this conception of economic efficiency. This is how most Americans would have it: most Americans reject the notion that the natural environment should be made over to serve the wants of the self-interested consumer. Part II describes the way that economists have attempted to take account of citizen or community-regarding preferences. I suggest that …


Antitrust Law, Competition, And The Macroeconomy, Peter C. Carstensen Jan 1981

Antitrust Law, Competition, And The Macroeconomy, Peter C. Carstensen

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This article examines the links between antitrust law-one possible tool for dealing with economic ills-and macroeconomic structure. It analyzes the current policy and economic assumptions underlying the importance of antitrust enforcement in reaching a healthy, competitive economy and concludes that such enforcement does contribute to the increased effectiveness of macroeconomic tools.

Part I explores the current macroeconomic theories and their policy implications. Part II discusses the related concepts of market power and competition and concludes that dissipation of market power is preferable, but that the regulation of market power may yield significant social and economic benefits in the short run, …