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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Law
Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case For Private Antitrust Enforcement, Joshua P. Davis, Robert H. Lande
Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case For Private Antitrust Enforcement, Joshua P. Davis, Robert H. Lande
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The conventional wisdom is that private antitrust enforcement lacks any value. Indeed, skepticism of private enforcement has been so great that its critics make contradictory claims. The first major line of criticism is that private enforcement achieves too little — it does not even minimally compensate the actual victims of antitrust violations and does not significantly deter those violations. A second line of criticism contends that private enforcement achieves too much — providing excessive compensation, often to the wrong parties, and producing overdeterrence. This article undertakes the first ever systematic evaluation of these claims. Building upon original empirical work and …
Can You Hear Me Now?: Making Participatory Governance Work For The Poor, Jaime Alison Lee
Can You Hear Me Now?: Making Participatory Governance Work For The Poor, Jaime Alison Lee
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Participatory governance engages people who are affected by a problem in the process of solving it. A participatory-governance approach to inner-city crime, for example, might include local residents in the process of designing a community-policing program. In recent decades, courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, and other institutions all have used participatory-governance approaches to tackle complex problems of law and public policy.
Some herald the potential for participatory-governance schemes to improve legal and policy outcomes, increase institutional accountability, empower marginalized groups, and further democratic ideals of self-determination and equality. Yet participatory-governance schemes can also promote the capture of public power by private …
Toward An Empirical And Theoretical Assessment Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Joshua P. Davis, Robert H. Lande
Toward An Empirical And Theoretical Assessment Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Joshua P. Davis, Robert H. Lande
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The dominant view in the antitrust field is that private enforcement cases, and especially class actions, accomplish little or nothing positive but, on the contrary, are counterproductive. Despite strongly worded convictions, that view has been premised on anecdotal, self-serving and insufficiently substantiated claims. Indeed, the authors' 2008 study of 40 private cases appears to constitute the only systematic effort to gather information about a significant number of private antitrust actions. That study generated a great deal of controversy, including questioning of our conclusions by high officials at the Department of Justice and by Professor Daniel Crane at the University of …
The Extraordinary Deterrence Of Private Antitrust Enforcement: A Reply To Werden, Robert H. Lande, Joshua P. Davis
The Extraordinary Deterrence Of Private Antitrust Enforcement: A Reply To Werden, Robert H. Lande, Joshua P. Davis
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Our article, "Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws," 2011 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 315, documented an extraordinary but usually overlooked fact: private antitrust enforcement deters a significant amount of anticompetitive conduct. Indeed, the article showed that private enforcement "probably" deters even more anticompetitive conduct than the almost universally admired anti-cartel enforcement program of the United States Department of Justice.
In a recent issue of Antitrust Bulletin, Gregory J. Werden, Scott D. Hammond, and Belinda A. Barnett challenged our analysis. They asserted that our comparison “is more misleading than informative.” It is unsurprising that they …