Law Commons^™

Purpose Proposals, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

Repurposing the corporation is the hot issue in corporate governance. Commentators, investors and increasingly issuers, maintain that corporations should shift their focus from maximizing profits for shareholders to generating value for a more expansive group of stakeholders. Corporations are also being called upon to address societal concerns – from climate change and voting rights to racial justice and wealth inequality.

The shareholder proposal rule, Rule 14a–8, offers one potential tool for repurposing the corporation. This Article describes the introduction of innovative proposals seeking to formalize corporate commitments to stakeholder governance. These “purpose proposals” reflect a new dynamic in the debate …

The Humanities Strike Back: (E)Esg And Justice Strine Challenge Gamer Shareholder Primacy, David H. Webber

Faculty Scholarship

Leo E. Strine, Jr. is closing in on Blair and Stout for the undisputed title of all-time top-scoring stakeholderist.³ I don't intend to squander this opportunity to roast and toast him by weighing the pros and cons of basketscoring primacy. Instead, my aim is to surface an overlooked argument in the debate over shareholder primacy and stakeholderism, the case for which has been recently reinvigorated by Strine's work. My argument is this: one underappreciated aspect of shareholder primacy's appeal is that it creates a competition with a single endpoint, basically a game, and that the exhilarating tournament that results, …

Employee Benefits Law—Shifting The Burden Out Of Neutral: Why Burden-Shifting Is Necessary In Erisa Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Claims, William G. Mcgrath

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

No abstract provided.

Corporate Governance Reform And The Sustainability Imperative, Christopher Bruner

Scholarly Works

Recent years have witnessed a significant upsurge of interest in alternatives to shareholder-centric corporate governance, driven by a growing sustainability imperative—widespread recognition that business as usual, despite the short-term returns generated, could undermine social and economic stability and even threaten our long-term survival if we fail to grapple with associated costs. We remain poorly positioned to assess corporate governance reform options, however, because prevailing theoretical lenses effectively cabin the terms of the debate in ways that obscure many of the most consequential possibilities. According to prevailing frameworks, our options essentially amount to board-versus-shareholder power, and shareholder-versus stakeholder purpose. This narrow …

Judicial Review Of Directors' Duty Of Care: A Comparison Between U.S. & China, Zhaoyi Li

Articles

Articles 147 and 148 of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (“Chinese Company Law”) establish that directors owe a duty of care to their companies. However, both of these provisions fail to explain the role of judicial review in enforcing directors’ duty of care. The duty of care is a well-trodden territory in the United States, where directors’ liability is predicated on specific standards. The current American standard, adopted by many states, requires directors to “discharge their duties with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.” However, both …

Duty And Diversity, Chris Bummer, Leo E. Strine Jr.

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

In the wake of the brutal deaths of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor, lawmakers and corporate boards from Wall Street to the West Coast have introduced a slew of reforms aimed at increasing Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (“DEI”) in corporations. Yet the reforms face difficulties ranging from possible constitutional challenges to critical limitations in their scale, scope, and degree of legal obligation and practical effects.

In this Article, we provide an old answer to the new questions facing DEI policy and offer the first close examination of how corporate law duties impel and facilitate corporate attention to diversity. Specifically, we …

Artificially Intelligent Boards And The Future Of Delaware Corporate Law, Christopher Bruner

Scholarly Works

This article argues that the prospects for Artificial Intelligence (AI) to impact corporate law are at once over- and under-stated, focusing on the law of Delaware – the predominant jurisdiction of incorporation for US public companies. Claims that AI systems might displace human directors not only exaggerate AI’s foreseeable technological potential, but ignore doctrinal and institutional impediments intrinsic to Delaware’s competitive model – notably, heavy reliance on nuanced applications of the fiduciary duty of loyalty by a true court of equity. At the same time, however, there are discrete AI applications that might not merely be accommodated by Delaware corporate …

Artificially Intelligent Boards And The Future Of Delaware Corporate Law, Christopher Bruner

Scholarly Works

The prospects for Artificial Intelligence (AI) to impact the development of Delaware corporate law are at once over- and under-stated. As a general matter, claims to the effect that AI systems might ultimately displace human directors not only exaggerate the foreseeable technological potential of these systems, but also tend to ignore doctrinal and institutional impediments intrinsic to Delaware's competitive model – notably, heavy reliance on nuanced and context-specific applications of the fiduciary duty of loyalty by a true court of equity. At the same time, however, there are specific applications of AI systems that might not merely be accommodated by …

To Call A Donkey A Racehorse—The Fiduciary Duty Misnomer In Corporate And Securities Law, Marc I. Steinberg

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

A recurrent theme in corporate law is the presence of directors and officers owing fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the respective companies they serve. Although not as visible in the securities law setting, concepts of fiduciary duty-like obligations arise with some frequency. While the rigorous application of fiduciary standards was applied in days of yesteryear, its adherence today largely is nonexistent. Nonetheless, courts continue to embrace language in their opinions that emphasizes the continued presence of fiduciary duty standards. Reality, however, strikes a very different key. In fact, standards of fiduciary duty have become greatly diluted in the …

Should Labor Abandon Its Capital? A Reply To Critics, David H. Webber

Faculty Scholarship

Several recent works have sharply criticized public pension funds and labor union funds (“labor’s capital”). These critiques come from both the left and right. Leftists criticize labor’s capital for undermining worker interests by funding financialization and the growth of Wall Street. Laissez-faire conservatives argue that pension underfunding threatens taxpayers. The left calls for pensions to be replaced by a larger social security system. The libertarian right calls for them to be smashed and scattered into individually-managed 401(k)s. I review this recent work, some of which is aimed at my book, The Rise of the Working-Class Shareholder: Labor’s Last Best Weapon, …

Excessive Fee Litigation In Light Of Hughes V. Northwestern University, Kathryn L. Moore

Law Faculty Books and Chapters

On September 11, 2006, Jerry Schlichter, a personal injury lawyer from St. Louis, Missouri, rocked the 401(k) plan market by filing a flurry of lawsuits against major corporations alleging that their 401(k) plans were paying excessive fees for plan administration and asset management that harmed employees in violation of their fiduciary duties under ERISA. Between 2006 and 2007, 31 excessive fee suits were filed by Schlichter and other firms. Following several large settlements, including a $62 million settlement by Lockheed Martin, a second wave of excessive fee litigation began in 2015 with more than 50 suits filed in both 2016 …