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Articles 1 - 22 of 22
Full-Text Articles in Law
Anti-Sharing As A Theory Of Partnerships And Firms, Robert D. Cooter, Roland Kirstein
Anti-Sharing As A Theory Of Partnerships And Firms, Robert D. Cooter, Roland Kirstein
Robert Cooter
Anti-Sharing may improve the efficiency of teams. The Anti-Sharer collects a fixed payment from all team members; he receives the actual output and pays out its value to them. However, if a team members assumes the role of an "internal" Anti-Sharer, he will be unproductive in equilibrium. Hence, internal Anti-Sharing fails to yield the first-best outcome. External Anti-Sharing may induce the team members to choose efficient effort. The paper presents possible applications of Anti-Sharing: while internal Anti-Sharing may provide an explanation for the existence of senior (or managing) partners, external Anti-Sharing leads to a new theory of the incorporated firm.
Using Sarbanes-Oxley Act To Reward Honest Corporations, Tamar Frankel
Using Sarbanes-Oxley Act To Reward Honest Corporations, Tamar Frankel
Faculty Scholarship
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act offers an opportunity to reward truthful corporations and their management, offering them a competitive advantage by relieving them from some of the Act's provisions. Corporate culture plays an important role in a corporation's honest behavior One size does not fit all in matters of organizational integrity. The provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that apply the same internal controls and governance rules on all public corporations impose unnecessary costs on honest corporations by requiring them to change one set of good habits that are part of the corporate culture for another mandated by law. This essay suggests that …
Piercing The Corporate Veil In West Virginia: The Extension Of Laya To All Sophisticated Commercial Entities, J. Jarrod Jordan
Piercing The Corporate Veil In West Virginia: The Extension Of Laya To All Sophisticated Commercial Entities, J. Jarrod Jordan
West Virginia Law Review
No abstract provided.
Megasubsidiaries And Asset Sales Under Section 271: Which Shareholders Must Approve Subsidiary Asset Sales, Yaman Shukairy
Megasubsidiaries And Asset Sales Under Section 271: Which Shareholders Must Approve Subsidiary Asset Sales, Yaman Shukairy
Michigan Law Review
Corporate law statutes determine the nature of the relationship between shareholders, the principal owners of the corporation, and the board of directors, those w ho run and operate the corporation. Under the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL"), many of the powers are delegated to the board of directors. More specifically, under section 141, "the business and affairs of every corporation . . . [are] managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . ." The Delaware courts have interpreted this provision by deferring to decisions by directors and their designated management under the business judgment …
What Default Rules Teach Us About Corporations; What Understanding Corporations Teaches Us About Default Rules, Tamar Frankel
What Default Rules Teach Us About Corporations; What Understanding Corporations Teaches Us About Default Rules, Tamar Frankel
Faculty Scholarship
This Article addresses corporate law's default rules, which allow corporations to waive their directors' liability for damages based on a breach of their fiduciary duty of care. Most large publicly held corporations have adopted such a waiver in their articles of association. This Article suggests that courts should limit the range of the waivers to the circumstances that existed when the voters voted and to the information they received before they voted. This Article distinguishes between public contracts (legislation) and private contracts (commercial transactions) and the default rules that apply to each. The Article shows that courts view corporations and …
Origins Of The Asymmetric Society: Freedom Of Incorporation In The Early United States And Canada, Jason Kaufman
Origins Of The Asymmetric Society: Freedom Of Incorporation In The Early United States And Canada, Jason Kaufman
Studio for Law and Culture
This article explores the origins of a phenomenon of lasting and profound impact on American society: the private business corporation. Business is only part of our concern here, however. Seen in comparative-historical terms, the modern private corporation was born in colonial (i.e. pre-Revolutionary) America. Surprisingly, this occurred not only because of the business needs of colonial Americans but also as a result of their own struggles for political autonomy. More specifically, the post-Revolutionary doctrine of freedom of incorporation first emerged in states that were originally chartered as private corporations. These “corporate colonies’” experienced repeated conflict with the Crown over their …
Understanding Maryland's Business Judgment Rule, Bernard S. Sharfman
Understanding Maryland's Business Judgment Rule, Bernard S. Sharfman
Bernard S Sharfman
No abstract provided.
Clearing Away The Mist: Suggestions For Developing A Principled Veil Piercing Doctrine In China, Bradley C. Reed
Clearing Away The Mist: Suggestions For Developing A Principled Veil Piercing Doctrine In China, Bradley C. Reed
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
It was less than thirty years ago that China stood economically isolated from the rest of the world. Times have certainly changed. Today China's economy is one of the fastest growing in the world, and Western businesses are inundating the country to access the abundance of cheap labor. Corporate activity is progressing, yet it was only twelve years ago that China enacted its first corporate law which officially recognized the concept of limited liability. And it was not until less than a year ago that China recognized one of the most important (and most often litigated) corporate law doctrines: piercing …
Someplace Between Philosophy And Economics: Legitimacy And Good Corporate Lawyering, Donald C. Langevoort
Someplace Between Philosophy And Economics: Legitimacy And Good Corporate Lawyering, Donald C. Langevoort
Fordham Law Review
No abstract provided.
A Tale Of Two Trajectories, Cynthia A. Williams
A Tale Of Two Trajectories, Cynthia A. Williams
Fordham Law Review
No abstract provided.
The "Bad Man" Goes To Washington: The Effect Of Political Influence On Corporate Duty, Jill E. Fisch
The "Bad Man" Goes To Washington: The Effect Of Political Influence On Corporate Duty, Jill E. Fisch
Fordham Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Essential Role Of Securities Regulation, Zohar Goshen, Gideon Parchomovsky
The Essential Role Of Securities Regulation, Zohar Goshen, Gideon Parchomovsky
Faculty Scholarship
This Article posits that the essential role of securities regulation is to create a competitive market for sophisticated professional investors and analysts (information traders). The Article advances two related theses – one descriptive and the other normative. Descriptively, the Article demonstrates that securities regulation is specifically designed to facilitate and protect the work of information traders. Securities regulation may be divided into three broad categories: (i) disclosure duties; (ii) restrictions on fraud and manipulation; and (iii) restrictions on insider trading – each of which contributes to the creation of a vibrant market for information traders. Disclosure duties reduce information traders’ …
From Fretting Takeovers To Vetting Cfius: Finding A Balance In U.S. Policy Regarding Foreign Acquisitions Of Domestic Assets, Gaurav Sud
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Merger law in the United States has historically relied on a system of private ordering with as little intervention from the federal government as possible. This scheme lies in stark contrast to the merger law of many other developed nations and, as such, has become a trademark of U.S. corporate law. Recent events, however, have brought into question the system's desirability in cross-border transactions where foreign entities are investing in U.S. assets. Proponents of reform argue that the federal government should become more involved in the approval process for these transactions given increased concerns of national security, while opponents argue …
Good Faith, State Of Mind, And The Outer Boundaries Of Director Liability In Corporate Law, Christopher M. Bruner
Good Faith, State Of Mind, And The Outer Boundaries Of Director Liability In Corporate Law, Christopher M. Bruner
Scholarly Works
The Delaware General Corporation Law was amended in 1986 to permit shareholder-approved exculpatory charter provisions shielding corporate directors from monetary liability for certain fiduciary duty breaches not including (among other things) breaches of the duty of loyalty and acts not in good faith. This article examines the development of corporate fiduciary duty doctrine in Delaware leading up to and following this statutory amendment, focusing particularly on the Delaware courts' evolving conception of the meaning anddoctrinal status of the good faith concept employed in recent cases to permit a non-exculpable cause ofaction for conscious nonfeasance.
The article argues that Delaware's good …
Language, Deals And Standards: The Future Of Xml Contracts, Lawrence A. Cunningham
Language, Deals And Standards: The Future Of Xml Contracts, Lawrence A. Cunningham
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
eXtensible Markup Language (XML) structures information in documentary systems ranging from financial reports to medical records and business contracts. XML standards for specific applications are developed spontaneously by self-appointed technologists or entrepreneurs. XML's social and economic stakes are considerable, especially when developed for the private law of contracts. XML can reduce transaction costs but also limit the range of contractual expression and redefine the nature of law practice. So reliance on spontaneous development may be sub-optimal and identification of a more formal public standard setting model necessary. To exploit XML's advantages while minimizing risks, this Article envisions creating a publicly …
The Political Dynamics Of Corporate Legislation: Lessons From Israel, Yael T. Ben-Zion
The Political Dynamics Of Corporate Legislation: Lessons From Israel, Yael T. Ben-Zion
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
No abstract provided.
The Internal Point Of View In Law And Ethics: Introduction, Benjamin C. Zipursky
The Internal Point Of View In Law And Ethics: Introduction, Benjamin C. Zipursky
Fordham Law Review
No abstract provided.
Federalism In Corporate/Securities Law: Reflections On Delaware, California, And State Regulation Of Insider Trading, Donald C. Langevoort
Federalism In Corporate/Securities Law: Reflections On Delaware, California, And State Regulation Of Insider Trading, Donald C. Langevoort
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In this brief Essay, I offer some thoughts on both the theory and the politics underlying the federalism question. My comments will touch on some of the controversies and also look at a somewhat quieter question, the state regulation of insider trading. Over the course of the last few years, judges in California and Delaware have traveled markedly different routes on questions involving the states' role in regulating insider trading. A California court of appeal has recently expanded the reach of the state insider trading statute to cover a claim alleging misconduct in California by an executive of a Delaware …
Legal Ground Rules In Coordinated And Liberal Market Economies, Katharina Pistor
Legal Ground Rules In Coordinated And Liberal Market Economies, Katharina Pistor
Faculty Scholarship
This chapter seeks to explain the affinity between the nature of economic systems: coordinated market economies (CMEs) and liberal market economies (LMEs) on the one hand, and legal origin (civil vs common law systems) on the other. It starts with the simple observation that LMEs tend to be common law jurisdictions, and CMEs civil law jurisdictions. It proposes that the affinity between economic and legal system offers important insights into the foundations of different types of market economies and, in particular, differences in the scope of the state vs the powers of the individual. The main argument is that the …
Clark's Treatise On Corporate Law: Filling Manning's Empty Towers, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman
Clark's Treatise On Corporate Law: Filling Manning's Empty Towers, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman
Faculty Scholarship
Almost 45 years ago, in an elegantly depressive account of the then current state of corporate law scholarship, Bayless Manning announced the death of corporation law "as a field of intellectual effort." Manning left us with an affecting image of a once grand field long past its prime, rigid with formalism and empty of content:
When American law ceased to take the "corporation" seriously, the entire body of law that had been built upon that intellectual construct slowly perforated and rotted away. We have nothing left but our great empty corporate statutes towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together …
From Incongruity To Cooperative Federalism, Reza Dibadj
From Incongruity To Cooperative Federalism, Reza Dibadj
Reza Dibadj
The conventional wisdom has been that state law governs internal affairs, and federal law governs disclosure. This reassuring construct, however, has little basis in today's reality. Left alone, states have not provided adequate shareholder protections: state securities laws were historically anemic, and the regulatory reach of state corporate law shrank under a prevailing contractarian ethos. As consequence, beginning in 1933, federal securities laws emerged to regulate many internal affairs. Curiously, however, as federal regulation has grown and become increasingly preemptive over the past decade, it has often decreased shareholder protections. As a consequence, some states have recently reversed course, using …
Delayering Corporate Law, Reza Dibadj
Delayering Corporate Law, Reza Dibadj
Reza Dibadj
Corporate law has become unnecessarily complicated. Despite the proliferation of laws, problems fester and scandals erupt. Something is wrong. This Article seeks to delayer corporate law - to strip it down to its essence - and after doing so, offer concrete suggestions for reform. It is a first step toward a new minimalist architecture for corporate law. The Article begins by arguing that the core of state corporate law - corporation statutes and fiduciary duties - currently offer precious little protection to shareholders. Contractarianism, manifested through enabling statues, reflects weak economics. Existing fiduciary duties are little more than rhetorical flourish. …