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Full-Text Articles in Law
In The Case Of Lyle V. Warner Bros. Television Productions, Et Al.: A Brief Amicus Curiae, Russell K. Robinson
In The Case Of Lyle V. Warner Bros. Television Productions, Et Al.: A Brief Amicus Curiae, Russell K. Robinson
Russell K Robinson
No abstract provided.
Introductory Note To Brief Of Amicus Curiae In Ebay V. Mercexchange, Robert P. Merges
Introductory Note To Brief Of Amicus Curiae In Ebay V. Mercexchange, Robert P. Merges
Robert P Merges
No abstract provided.
When The Court Has A Party, How Many Friends Show Up - A Note On The Statistical Distribution Of Amicus Brief Filings, Daniel A. Farber
When The Court Has A Party, How Many Friends Show Up - A Note On The Statistical Distribution Of Amicus Brief Filings, Daniel A. Farber
Daniel A Farber
This article examines the statistical distribution of amicus brief filings. The previous research on the distribution of amicus brief filings had examined the patterns of citation frequency in order to test three models. The current study tests these models in the context of amicus brief filings. The two primary results of the current study are presented. First, a power law distribution does provide improved fit over linear regression. Second, amicus brief filings are unrelated to the number of federal appellate citations received by an opinion.
Brief Of Amici Curiae Economists In Support Of Petitioners, Bell Atlantic V. Twombly, Vernon L. Smith, William J. Baumol, Michael J. Boskin, Robert W. Crandall, Kenneth G. Elzinga, David S. Evans, Gerald R. Faulhaber, Franklin M. Fisher, Luke Froeb, Richard J. Gilbert, Paul L. Joskow, Michael L. Katz, Paul R. Milgrom, Thomas G. Moore, Janusz A. Ordover, Robert H. Porter, Frederic M. Scherer, Richard Schmalensee, Marius Schwartz, David S. Sibley, Edward A. Snyder, A. Michael Spence, Pablo T. Spiller, Alan O. Sykes, David Teece, Michael D. Whinston
Brief Of Amici Curiae Economists In Support Of Petitioners, Bell Atlantic V. Twombly, Vernon L. Smith, William J. Baumol, Michael J. Boskin, Robert W. Crandall, Kenneth G. Elzinga, David S. Evans, Gerald R. Faulhaber, Franklin M. Fisher, Luke Froeb, Richard J. Gilbert, Paul L. Joskow, Michael L. Katz, Paul R. Milgrom, Thomas G. Moore, Janusz A. Ordover, Robert H. Porter, Frederic M. Scherer, Richard Schmalensee, Marius Schwartz, David S. Sibley, Edward A. Snyder, A. Michael Spence, Pablo T. Spiller, Alan O. Sykes, David Teece, Michael D. Whinston
Richard Gilbert
The "parallel behavior is enough" standard cannot assist the courts in distinguishing horizontal agreements to restrain trade from normal competition. It would very likely impose significant costs on the economy by distorting competitive incentives and encouraging meritless litigation designed mainly to induce financial settlements.
Brief Of Amici Curiae Economists In Support Of Petitioners, Bell Atlantic V. Twombly, Vernon L. Smith, William J. Baumol, Michael J. Boskin, Robert W. Crandall, Kenneth G. Elzinga, David S. Evans, Gerald R. Faulhaber, Franklin M. Fisher, Luke Froeb, Richard J. Gilbert, Paul L. Joskow, Michael L. Katz, Paul R. Milgrom, Thomas G. Moore, Janusz A. Ordover, Robert H. Porter, Frederic M. Scherer, Richard Schmalensee, Marius Schwartz, David S. Sibley, Edward A. Snyder, A. Michael Spence, Pablo T. Spiller, Alan O. Sykes, David Teece, Michael D. Whinston
Brief Of Amici Curiae Economists In Support Of Petitioners, Bell Atlantic V. Twombly, Vernon L. Smith, William J. Baumol, Michael J. Boskin, Robert W. Crandall, Kenneth G. Elzinga, David S. Evans, Gerald R. Faulhaber, Franklin M. Fisher, Luke Froeb, Richard J. Gilbert, Paul L. Joskow, Michael L. Katz, Paul R. Milgrom, Thomas G. Moore, Janusz A. Ordover, Robert H. Porter, Frederic M. Scherer, Richard Schmalensee, Marius Schwartz, David S. Sibley, Edward A. Snyder, A. Michael Spence, Pablo T. Spiller, Alan O. Sykes, David Teece, Michael D. Whinston
Vernon L. Smith
The "parallel behavior is enough" standard cannot assist the courts in distinguishing horizontal agreements to restrain trade from normal competition. It would very likely impose significant costs on the economy by distorting competitive incentives and encouraging meritless litigation designed mainly to induce financial settlements.