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Full-Text Articles in Law
Putting The Equity Back Into Intellectual Property Remedies, Henry E. Smith
Putting The Equity Back Into Intellectual Property Remedies, Henry E. Smith
Notre Dame Law Review
Within the realm of remedies, intellectual property remedies have presented particular difficulties, and in intellectual property law, controversy has focused on remedies. Concerns about holdup in intellectual property have even begun to lead to innovations in the law of remedies itself. Many of the difficulties and controversies raging now center around remedies that are “equitable.” In this Essay I argue that recovering a major function of equity—as meta-law— helps us understand these problems and to offer potential solutions. Meta-law is a higher order intervention when regular law fails, in contexts of high complexity and uncertainty, often stemming from polycentricity, conflicting …
The Morality Of Fiduciary Law, Paul B. Miller
The Morality Of Fiduciary Law, Paul B. Miller
Journal Articles
Recent work of fiduciary theory has provided conceptual synthesis requisite to understanding core fiduciary principles and the structure of fiduciary liability. However, normative questions have received only sporadic attention. What values animate fiduciary law? How does, or ought, fiduciary law prove responsive to them?
Where in other areas of private law theory – notably, tort theory – pioneering scholars went directly at normative questions like these, fiduciary theory has been exceptional for the reticence shown toward them. The reticence is sensible. Fiduciary principles are the product of equity’s most extended and convoluted program of supplementing surrounding law. They span several …
The Mischief Rule, Samuel L. Bray
The Mischief Rule, Samuel L. Bray
Journal Articles
The mischief rule tells an interpreter to read a statute in light of the “mischief” or “evil”—the problem that prompted the statute. The mischief rule has been associated with Blackstone’s appeal to a statute’s “reason and spirit” and with Hart-and-Sacks-style purposivism. Justice Scalia rejected the mischief rule. But the rule is widely misunderstood, both by those inclined to love it and those inclined to hate it. This Article reconsiders the mischief rule. It shows that the rule has two enduringly useful functions: guiding an interpreter to a stopping point for statutory language that can be given a broader or narrower …