Law Commons^™

Originalism And The Aristotelian Tradition: Virtue’S Home In Originalism, Lee Strang

Lee J Strang

A concept fundamental to philosophy—virtue—is, with a few notable exceptions, absent from scholarship on constitutional interpretation generally, and originalism in particular. Furthermore, common perceptions of both virtue ethics and originalism have prevented exploration of how incorporating virtue ethics’ insights may make originalism a better theory of constitutional interpretation. This Article fills that void by explaining the many ways in which concepts from virtue ethics are compatible with an originalist theory of constitutional interpretation. More importantly, I show that originalism is more normatively attractive and descriptively accurate when it takes on board virtue ethics’ insights.

Originalism must articulate virtue’s role in …

Originalism As Popular Constitutionalism?: Theoretical Possibilities And Practical Differences, Lee Strang

Lee J Strang

The common perception is that originalism and popular constitutionalism are incompatible. Supporting this perception is the widely-shared opinion that most advocates for popular constitutionalism are liberal while most originalists are conservative-libertarian. Not only is this the perception, it has a basis in reality. Looking at the names of leading originalists and popular constitutionalists reveals that there is significant overlap between originalism and conservatism-libertarianism, and between popular constitutionalism and liberalism.

In this Article, I argue that the common perception that originalism and popular constitutionalism are incompatible is mistaken. Instead, I show that there is no uniquely correct answer to the question …

Originalism As Popular Constitutionalism?: It Depends, Lee J. Strang

Lee J Strang

In this Article, I accomplish two goals: first, I describe the rise of popular constitutionalism as a movement in the legal academy along with its basic tenets; and second, I demonstrate that, given the diversity of originalist scholarship, originalism’s relationship to popular constitutionalism depends on the version of originalism one adopts. In the heart of Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?, I describe five axes upon which originalism pivots toward or away from popular constitutionalism. My claim is that the nuances of contemporary originalist scholarship—characterized by these five axes—make it impossible to definitively describe the relationship between originalism and popular constitutionalism.

An Originalist Theory Of Precedent: The Privileged Place Of Originalist Precedent, Lee Strang

Lee J Strang

In this Article, I show that originalism retains a robust role for originalist precedent thereby enabling originalism to fit our legal practice and appropriate the normative attractiveness of stare decisis. This Article therefore fills a prominent gap in originalist theory.

First, I briefly review the debate in originalism over the role of constitutional precedent.

Second, I describe how participants in our legal practice can distinguish between originalist and nonoriginalist precedent using a standard called Originalism in Good Faith. Under Originalism in Good Faith, precedents that are a good faith attempt to articulate and apply the Constitution’s original meaning, are originalist …

An Originalist Theory Of Precedent: The Epistemic And Metaphysical Attitudes Toward Originalist Precedent, Lee Strang

Lee J Strang

No abstract provided.