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From 'Tragedy' To 'Disaster': Welfare Effects Of Commons And Anticommons Dilemmas, Sven Vanneste, Francesco Parisi, Alain Vanhiel, Ben Depoorter Sep 2006

From 'Tragedy' To 'Disaster': Welfare Effects Of Commons And Anticommons Dilemmas, Sven Vanneste, Francesco Parisi, Alain Vanhiel, Ben Depoorter

Ben Depoorter

In this paper, we explore the alleged symmetry between commons and anticommons dilemmas. Our experimental results reveal an interesting asymmetry. Anticommons situations generate greater opportunistic behavior than an equivalent commons dilemma (Study 1), and anticommons dilemmas yield a greater risk for underuse compared to commons dilemmas (Study 2). The results of the present study bring to light important deviations from the economic model, suggesting that other factors, such as behavioral attitudes towards property and psychological variables, affect cooperation differently in anticommons and commons dilemmas. Our findings complement the existing experimental literature on commons dilemmas and contradict the presumed economic symmetry …


Horizontal Political Externalities: The Supply And Demand Of Disaster Management, Ben Depoorter Sep 2006

Horizontal Political Externalities: The Supply And Demand Of Disaster Management, Ben Depoorter

Ben Depoorter

This Article discusses the dynamics of shared political accountability and provides a supply- and demand-side analysis of disaster management. Because multiple levels of government share political accountability in national scale disasters, disaster management is subject to a collective action problem. Introducing the concept of horizontal political externalities, this Article explains the shortcomings of disaster management in terms of asymmetric political accountability costs for ex ante preparedness and ex post relief. In the presence of shared accountability, investments in prevention and relief by one government actor confer positive externalities upon other government actors by reducing the overall chance of being held …