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Full-Text Articles in Law
Arbitration Costs And Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, Christopher R. Drahozal
Arbitration Costs And Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, Christopher R. Drahozal
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
In this Article, written for this symposium issue on "Empirical Studies of Mandatory Arbitration," I examine the available empirical evidence on these two questions. I take "mandatory arbitration" to refer to pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer and employment (and maybe franchise) contracts. Accordingly, I limit my consideration of the empirical evidence to those types of contracts. I do not discuss empirical studies of international arbitrations, which almost always arise out of agreements between commercial entities. Nor do I discuss empirical studies of court-annexed arbitrations, which may not derive from party agreement and do not ordinarily proceed to a binding award.
Exploring Voluntary Arbitration Of Individual Employment Disputes, Alfred W. Blumrosen
Exploring Voluntary Arbitration Of Individual Employment Disputes, Alfred W. Blumrosen
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This Article outlines an arbitration process which may be employed in individual employment contracts to achieve a fair disposition of disputes, with the maximum finality for an arbitration decision which is consistent with legal principles. Where finality is not possible, arbitration would be a condition precedent to formal legal processes. To assure fairness in the process, the employer would agree to pay the arbitrator's fee and the employee's attorney fees incurred in connection with the arbitration.
Challenging The Employment-At-Will Doctrine Through Modern Contract Theory, Clare Tully
Challenging The Employment-At-Will Doctrine Through Modern Contract Theory, Clare Tully
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This Note advocates an implied contract analysis that both satisfies contractual requirements and protects the reasonable expectations of employees and employers. Part I describes the various reliance interests that employees bring to their jobs, the employer inducements that cause this reliance, and the business benefits that accrue when employees rely upon these inducements. Part II examines in detail judicial reluctance to enforce either these reliance interests or employer promises as contract rights under the at-will doctrine. Part II also urges the increased use of modern contract theories such as promissory estoppel, quasi-contract, and implied contract to protect employee reliance interests …