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A Bargaining Analysis Of American Labor Law And The Search For Bargaining Equity And Industrial Peace, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt

Michigan Law Review

In this article, I present an alternative economic analysis of unions and collective bargaining that utilizes recent advances in labor economics and some simple applications of game theory to address the deficiencies of the traditional monopoly model.

The article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I provide a brief primer on the economic analysis of unions and collective bargaining. I discuss the various possible sources of union wage increases, possible employer responses to union wage demands, and alternative models of the costs of collective bargaining. In Part II, I outline the traditional monopoly theory of unions by combining the …

Deferral To The Intraunion Appellate Process: A Response, Paul Alan Levy

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

In their recent Article on the deferral policy of the National Labor Relations Board (Board or NLRB), two attorneys for the United Auto Workers (UAW), Leonard Page and Daniel W. Sherrick, argue that the Board has adopted "an indefensible double standard" by applying its policy of "deferral to arbitration" only to contractual dispute resolution processes but not to intraunion review procedures. By deferring to intraunion procedures, they contend, the Board would further many of the same policy objectives it now achieves by deferring to arbitration, with the added benefit of advancing the interest in democratic union self-government. Moreover, by drawing …

Further Thoughts On Deferral To Private Dispute Resolution Procedures: A Response, Leonard Page, Daniel W. Sherrick

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

We would first like to respond to one aspect of Levy's Article before discussing our proposal. Levy seems to argue as a general matter that "joint committee" determinations should not receive the same deference as arbitral resolutions. After establishing some of the basic analytic parameters in Part I of this Response, we argue in Part II that Levy's distinction between joint committees and arbitral resolutions has no relevance to disputes concerning contractual rights, and is useful only in the context of disputes concerning statutory rights. In Part III, we outline a framework for analyzing internal union review procedures that will …

Which Side Are You On?: Trying To Be For Labor When It's Flat On Its Back, John Edward Connelly

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Which Side Are You On?: Trying to Be for Labor When It's Flat on Its Back by Thomas Geoghegan

Federal Jurisdiction Over Union Constitutions After Wooddell, James E. Pfander

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

Labor, Theodore J. St. Antoine

Book Chapters

Labor relations present three principal kinds of constitutional issues. First, to what extent does the first amendment protect employees’ efforts to organize labor unions and solicit support, and to what extent does it limit the power of unions over their members? Second, how does the doctrine of federal preemption restrict the states in regulating union and management activities? Third, what due process guarantees may employers and employees invoke in response to federal and state laws establishing new substantive rules and remedies in employment? Although the Supreme Court has never squarely?

Effective Democracy And Formal Rights: Retaliatory Removals Of Union Officials Under The Lmrda, George Feldman

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Justice Thomas And Lechmere, Inc. V. Nlrb: A Reply To Professor Robert A. Gorman, Leonard Bierman

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Union Raids, Union Democracy, And The Market For Union Control, Stewart J. Schwab

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

In this article, Professor Schwab compares the union member-leader relationship to the corporate shareholder-manager relationship and examines what can be learned from the voluminous literature regarding corporate control about problems of internal union democracy. Specifically, he questions whether a viable market for union control does or could exist that might induce leaders to act in the interests of their members. He analyzes the structural weaknesses in the market for union control and the legal factors inhibiting a union takeover market. Schwab concludes that a weak market does exist, despite the nonprofit nature of unions that limits the ability of leaders …