Law Commons^™

Wage-Setting Institutions And Corporate Governance, Matthew Dimick, Neel Rao

Journal Articles

Why do corporate governance law and practice differ across countries? This paper explains how wage-setting institutions influence ownership structures and investor protection laws. In particular, we identify a nonmonotonic relationship between the level of centralization in wage-bargaining institutions and the level of ownership concentration and investor protection laws. As wage setting becomes more centralized, ownership concentration within firms at first becomes more, and then less, concentrated. In addition, the socially optimal level of investor protection laws is decreasing in ownership concentration. Thus, as wage-setting institutions become more centralized, investor protection laws become less and then more protective. This explanation is …

The Customer Is Not Always Right: Balancing Worker And Customer Welfare In Antitrust Law, Clayton J. Masterman

Journal Articles

A natural consequence of employer restraints of trade that decrease wages is lower prices. Under antitrust law, courts evaluate most such restraints of trade under the rule of reason. This Note argues that the rule of reason’s focus on consumer welfare and the natural price decrease that follows from employer restraints of trade cause underenforcement of antitrust law against anticompetitive employer conduct. Such a result is anomalous, because the consumer welfare standard that permeates antitrust law should protect employees as much as customers that purchase goods.

To solve the under-enforcement problem, this Note proposes that courts analyzing a restraint of …

Protecting The Compromised Worker: A Challenge For Employment Discrimination Law, Peter Siegelman

Buffalo Law Review

No abstract provided.

Political Decision-Making At The National Labor Relations Board: An Empirical Examination Of The Board's Unfair Labor Practice Disputes Through The Clinton And Bush Ii Years, Amy Semet

Journal Articles

Does partisan ideology influence the voting of members of multi-member adjudicatory bodies at “independent agencies”? In studying the federal circuit courts of appeals, scholars have found that results of cases vary depending upon the partisan composition of the particular panel hearing a case. Few scholars to date, however, have systematically studied whether partisan panel effects occur in administrative adjudication. In this Article, I explore the impact that partisan ideology and panel composition have on the vote choices of an administrative agency rumored to be one of the most partisan: the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”). Employing an original dataset of …