Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Law
Restricting Public Employees' Political Activities: Good Government Or Partisan Politics?, Rafael Gely, Timothy D. Chandler
Restricting Public Employees' Political Activities: Good Government Or Partisan Politics?, Rafael Gely, Timothy D. Chandler
Faculty Publications
The article starts by reviewing, in Part II, the history of the regulation of political activities by public employees, and in Part III, the regulation of patronage. Part IV develops the argument that both sets of regulations, although justified on different grounds, are better understood as political control mechanisms. Part V provides some empirical evidence for this argument by examining voting patterns on federal legislation restricting public employees' political activities. Part VI discusses the relationship of these laws to public sector unionization. Part VII concludes the article.
New Plants As Natural Experiments In Economic Adjustment: Adjustment Costs, Learning-By-Doing And Lumpy Investment, James Bessen
New Plants As Natural Experiments In Economic Adjustment: Adjustment Costs, Learning-By-Doing And Lumpy Investment, James Bessen
Faculty Scholarship
A large sample of new plants is studied to reveal detailed adjustment behavior for capital, labor and productivity. Once production has begun, capital adjusts almost as quickly as labor. Overall, capital adjustment is lumpy while labor follows a learning-by-doing model rather than a convex adjustment cost model. Plants are quite heterogeneous, however: convex adjustment costs appear important at small plants, but large plants exhibit lumpy investment and substantial investment in learning-by-doing. A positive association between plant productivity growth and wages (and also the change in wages) corroborates the importance of learning-by-doing. Also, learning-by-doing appears to influence the behavior of large …