Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
- Publication
- Publication Type
Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Law
Probabilistic Compliance, Alex Raskolnikov
Probabilistic Compliance, Alex Raskolnikov
Faculty Scholarship
Uncertain legal standards are pervasive but understudied. The key theoretical result showing an ambiguous relationship between legal uncertainty and optimal deterrence remains largely undeveloped, and no alternative conceptual approaches to the economic analysis of legal uncertainty have emerged. This Article offers such an alternative by shifting from the well-established and familiar optimal deterrence theory to the new and unfamiliar probabilistic compliance framework. This shift brings the analysis closer to the world of legal practice and yields new theoretical insights. Most importantly, lower uncertainty tends to lead to more compliant positions and greater private gains. In contrast, the market for legal …
Standing Uncertainty: An Expected-Value Standard For Fear-Based Injury In Clapper V. Amnesty International Usa, Andrew C. Sand
Standing Uncertainty: An Expected-Value Standard For Fear-Based Injury In Clapper V. Amnesty International Usa, Andrew C. Sand
Michigan Law Review
The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff can have Article III standing based on a fear of future harm, or fear-based injury. The Court’s approach to fear-based injury, however, has been unclear and inconsistent. This Note seeks to clarify the Court’s doctrine using principles from probability theory. It contends that fear-based injury should be governed by a substantial-risk standard that encapsulates the probability concept of expected value. This standard appears in footnote 5 of Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, a recent case in which the Court held that a group of plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of …
New Pleading, New Discovery, Scott Dodson
New Pleading, New Discovery, Scott Dodson
Michigan Law Review
Pleading in federal court has a new narrative. The old narrative was one of notice, with the goal of broad access to the civil justice system. New Pleading, after the landmark Supreme Court cases of Twombly and Iqbal, is focused on factual sufficiency, with the purpose of screening out meritless cases that otherwise might impose discovery costs on defendants. The problem with New Pleading is that factual insufficiency often is a poor proxy for meritlessness. Some plaintifs lack sufficient factual knowledge of the elements of their claims not because the claims lack merit but because the information they need is …
On Legal Interpretations Of The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Paul H. Edelman
On Legal Interpretations Of The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Paul H. Edelman
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
There has been a spate of interest in the application of the Condorcet Jury Theorem to issues in the law. This theorem holds that a majority vote among a suitably large body of voters, all of whom are more likely than not to vote correctly, will almost surely result in the correct outcome. Its uses have ranged from estimating the correct size of juries to justifying the voting of creditors in Chapter 11 reorganizations. While the mathematics is unassailable, the legal interpretation of the conclusion is dependent on the model of probability one uses when invoking the assumption that the …
Answering The Bayesioskeptical Challenge, Richard D. Friedman
Answering The Bayesioskeptical Challenge, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
In recent years, some scholars of evidence, myself among them, have made active use of subjective probability theory - what is sometimes referred to as Bayesianism - in thinking about issues and problems related to the law of evidence. But, at the same time, this use has been challenged to various degrees and in various ways by scholars to whom I shall apply the collective, if somewhat misleading, label of Bayesioskeptics. I present this brief paper to defend this use of probability theory, and to discuss what I believe is its proper role in discourse about evidentiary issues.
Towards A (Bayesian) Convergence?, Richard D. Friedman
Towards A (Bayesian) Convergence?, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
If I understand them correctly, several leading Bayesioskeptics (Allen, Callen, Stein) acknowledge - with varying degrees of specificity and varying degrees of grudgingness - that standard probability theory can be useful as an analytical tool in considering evidentiary doctrines and the probative value of evidentiary items.