Law Commons^™

Legal Sets, Jeremy N. Sheff

Faculty Publications

In this Article, I propose that the practices of legal reasoning and analysis are helpfully understood as being primarily concerned not with rules or propositions, but with sets. This Article develops a formal model of the role of sets in the practices of legal actors in a common-law system defined by a recursive relationship between cases and rules. In doing so, it demonstrates how conceiving of legal doctrines as a universe of discourse comprising (sometimes nested or overlapping) sets of cases can clarify the logical structure that governs marginal cases and help organize the available options for resolving such cases …

The Well-Intentioned Purpose But Weak Epistemological Foundation Of Originalism, George C. Christie

Faculty Scholarship

The attraction of an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation is understandable. It is maintained that only that method can provide the judicial objectivity and certainty that constitutional adjudication requires. They claim that the traditional common-law evolutionary approach leads Supreme Court Justices to succumb to the temptation to fill in gaps in constitutional law and thereby ignore that major expansions in constitutional meaning and should be made in the way the Founders envisioned, namely by amendment of the Constitution. However difficult or impractical that process may be, it is the only way to avoid the politicization of the Court. Whether that …

Roberts’ Rules: The Assertiveness Of Rules-Based Jurisprudence, Joseph Blocher

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Judicial Legislation, Anthony D'Amato

Faculty Working Papers

My argument will be that it is unjust in the broadest view of our legal system for judges to legislate, even if they confine their legislation to the narrowest limits in the closest of cases. To the extent that my argument is successful in diminishing the judicial legislation position, it would tend to serve to corroborate Dworkin's rights thesis.

The Trial Judge's Equitable Discretion Following Ebay V. Mercexchange, Doug Rendleman

Scholarly Articles

None available.

Judicial Discretion To Condition, Thomas O. Main

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.

Traditional Equity And Contemporary Procedure, Thomas O. Main

Scholarly Works

This Article offers extensive background on the development and eventual merger of the regimes of law and equity, and suggests that the procedural infrastructure of a unified system must be sufficiently elastic to accommodate the traditional jurisdiction of equity. As the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure become increasingly more elaborate and technical, strict application of those procedural rules can generate mischievous results and hardship. This Article suggests that equity remains a source of authority for district judges to avoid the application of a procedural rule when technical compliance would produce an inequitable result. A separate system of equity provided a …

Law, Belief, And Bildung: The Education Of Harry Edwards, Brian C. Murchison

Scholarly Articles

Not available.

Anglo-American Jurisprudence And Latin America, John Linarelli

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.

The Tension Between Rules And Discretion In Family Law: A Report And Reflection, Carl E. Schneider

Articles

The history of law is many things. But one of them is the story of an unremitting struggle between rules and discretion. The tension between these two approaches to legal problems continues to pervade and perplex the law today. Perhaps nowhere is that tension more pronounced and more troubling than in family law. It is probably impossible to practice family law without wrestling with the imponderable choice between rules and discretion. Consider, for example, how many areas of family law are now being fought over in-just those terms. For decades we have lived with an abundantly discretionary way of resolving …

Eroding The Myth Of Discretionary Justice In Family Law: The Child Support Experiment, Jane C. Murphy

All Faculty Scholarship

Reliance on judicial discretion to resolve disputes is one of the most fundamental characteristics of the American legal system. Nowhere have judges exercised more unfettered discretion than in family law. Judicial discretion in this area, however, is not without its critics. In this Article Professor Jane Murphy recommends limiting the use of judicial discretion in family law matters. Professor Murphy argues that the lack of predictability which flows from discretionary decisions undermines our confidence in the equity of decisions and encourages protracted litigation.

Professor Murphy reviews the developing consensus that fixed rules are necessary to guide judges' discretion in divorce …