Law Commons^™

Impartiality In Judicial Ethics: A Jurisprudential Analysis, W. Bradley Wendel

W. Bradley Wendel

No abstract provided.

American Legal Realism And Practical Guidance, Joshua Davis, Manuel Vargas

Joshua P. Davis

H.L.A. Hart’s well-known rejection of American Legal Realism turned in part on the idea that Realism lacked the resources to provide the sort of guidance that we might reasonably seek from a theory of law. Although Hart's criticisms were widely regarded as devastating, in recent years American Legal Realism has undergone something of a renaissance. The principal architect of that renaissance is Brian Leiter, who has re-established Realism as an important and even indispensable approach to jurisprudence. In this chapter, our aim is to show how, despite its considerable attractions, Leiter’s brand of Legal Realism appears to be in much …

Between “Metaphysics Of The Stone Age” And The “Brave New World”: H.L.A. Hart On The Law’S Assumptions About Human Nature, Péter Cserne

Péter Cserne

This paper analyses H.L.A. Hart’s views on the epistemic character of the law’s assumptions about human behaviour, as articulated in Causation in the Law and Punishment and Responsibility. Hart suggests that the assumptions behind legal doctrines typically combine common sense factual beliefs, moral intuitions, and philosophical theories of earlier ages with sound moral principles, and empirical knowledge. An important task of legal theory is to provide a ‘rational and critical foundation’ for these doctrines. This does not only imply conceptual clarification in light of an epistemic ideal of objectivity but also involves legal theorists in ‘enlightenment’ about empirical facts, ‘demystification’ …

Le Concept Hartien D’Obligation Juridique, Stephen Utz

Stephen Gerard Utz

Punishment, Invalidation, And Nonvalidation: What H.L.A. Hart Did Not Explain, Richard Stith

Richard Stith

Elaborating first upon H. L. A. Hart's distinction between imposing duties and imposing disabilities, this article explores the two senses mentioned (but not fully explained) by Hart in which power-holders may be legally disabled. Legal invalidation (nullification) of norms that have been generated by vulnerable power-holders is seen to reduce diversity or pluralism in every normative sphere, from the supranational to the intrafamilial. By contrast, mere legal nonvalidation (noncognizance) of such norms tends to preserve the autonomy of the power-holders that created the norms, thus enhancing legal pluralism. Punishment for creating forbidden norms amounts in principle to an in-between sort …