Law Commons^™

The Constitutional Law Of Interpretation, Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Bradford R. Clark

Notre Dame Law Review

The current debate over constitutional interpretation often proceeds on the assumption that the Constitution does not provide rules for its own interpretation. Accordingly, several scholars have attempted to identify applicable rules by consulting external sources that governed analogous legal texts (such as statutes, treaties, contracts, etc.). The distinctive function of the Constitution—often forgotten or overlooked—renders these analogies largely unnecessary. The Constitution was an instrument used by the people of the several States to transfer a fixed set of sovereign rights and powers from one group of sovereigns (the States) to another sovereign (the federal government), while maintaining the “States” as …

The People's Court: On The Intellectual Origins Of American Judicial Power, Ian C. Bartrum

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

This article enters into the modern debate between “consti- tutional departmentalists”—who contend that the executive and legislative branches share constitutional interpretive authority with the courts—and what are sometimes called “judicial supremacists.” After exploring the relevant history of political ideas, I join the modern minority of voices in the latter camp.

This is an intellectual history of two evolving political ideas—popular sovereignty and the separation of powers—which merged in the making of American judicial power, and I argue we can only understand the structural function of judicial review by bringing these ideas together into an integrated whole. Or, put another way, …

Precedent And Disagreement, Glen Staszewski

Michigan Law Review

A review of Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: A Theory of Precedent.

A Matter Of Interpretation: Federal Courts And The Law, Charles R. Priest

Maine Law Review

Justice Scalia's engaging essay, “Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws,” and the four comments it provokes, should provide lawyers, judges, and other lawmakers with an interesting evening. Instead of presenting a theoretical view of the role of the federal courts in interpretation, Justice Scalia sketches out a case for “textualism.” “Textualism” is one of several currently contending methods of interpreting statutes and the United States Constitution, and is currently popular among federal judges who see their role as restricting government's powers to those expressly stated in the …

Stare Decisis And Constitutional Text, Jonathan F. Mitchell

Michigan Law Review

Almost everyone acknowledges that stare decisis should play a significant role when the Supreme Court of the United States resolves constitutional cases. Yet the academic and judicial rationales for this practice tend to rely on naked consequentialist considerations, and make only passing efforts to square the Court's stare decisis doctrines with the language of the Constitution. This Article offers a qualified defense of constitutional stare decisis that rests exclusively on constitutional text. It aims to broaden the overlapping consensus of interpretive theories that can support a role for constitutional stare decisis, but to do this it must narrow the circumstances …

A Subversive Strand Of The Warren Court, Gary Peller

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Marbury Ascendant: The Rehnquist Court And The Power To "Say What The Law Is", Timothy Zick

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

African Courts, International Law, And Comparative Case Law: Chimera Or Emerging Human Rights Jurisprudence?, Mirna E. Adjami

Michigan Journal of International Law

Though the potential creation of a supranational human rights court has brought international attention to the African human rights system, international law and human rights scholars rarely turn to African examples when studying the domestic application of international human rights norms. This Article seeks to fill that gap by analyzing cases from several Anglophone common law countries in sub-Saharan Africa that invoke international law and comparative case law as interpretive support in their national fundamental rights jurisprudence.

The Justice Who Wouldn't Be Lutheran: Toward Borrowing The Wisdom Of Faith Traditions, Marie A. Failinger

Cleveland State Law Review

Only a few legal scholars have attempted to work out what jurisprudence might look like if lawmakers and judges took their religious world-views seriously-and explicitly-in their work, in a way respectful of "the fact of pluralism." My task is to imagine the concrete case: what a judge's jurisprudence might look like if a judge considered the wisdom of his own religious tradition in constitutional cases. This article explores broad jurisprudential themes and specific First Amendment and social welfare opinions of Justice William Rehnquist, who for some years has been a member of a Lutheran congregation, my own denomination. While Justice …

Foreword: On Jaffa, Lincoln, Marshall, And Original Intent, Lewis E. Lehrman

Seattle University Law Review

This Foreword introduces the article to follow written by Harry V. Jaffa, scholar of Abraham Lincoln’s political philosophy. The Foreward provides background material necessary to contextualize the ongoing debate surrounding constitutional interpretation emphasizing original intent addressed in Jaffa's article.

Seven Questions For Professor Jaffa, George Anastaplo

Seattle University Law Review

This Article poses questions inspired by the four essays collected in Professor Harry V. Jaffa’s article “What Were the ‘Original Intentions’ of the Framers of the Constitution of the United States?” The Article offers, in addition to fresh reflections upon these questions, three appendices, which bear upon various matters touched upon by Professor Jaffa. These appendices include, “The Founders of Our Founders: Jerusalem, Athens, and the American Constitution,” “The Ambiguity of Justice in Plato’s Republic,” and “Private Rights and Public Law: The Founders’ Perspective.” The Epilogue provides informed observations of a scholar who comments on the differences between Professor …

Professor Harry V. Jaffa Divides The House: A Respectful Protest And A Defense Brief, Robert L. Stone

Seattle University Law Review

This Article replies to Professor’ Jaffa’s article, “What Were the ‘Original Intentions’ of the Framers of the Constitution of the United States?,” and book, The Crisis of the House Divided. The Article argues that Professor Jaffa’s method throughout his indictment of legal scholars has three flaws. First, the Article argues that Professor Jaffa takes statements of sensible political compromises-such as support for judicial restraint, British traditions, and local self-government-and treats them as if they were philosophical statements. Second, the author contends that Professor Jaffa assembles a composite indictment, which in law is appropriately applied only to an indictment against …

Judicial Conscience And Natural Rights: A Reply To Professor Jaffa, Bruce Ledewitz

Seattle University Law Review

This Article replies to Professor Harry V. Jaffa’s article “What Were the ‘Original Intentions’ of the Framers of the Constitution of the United States?” The Article focuses on the gap the author argues Professor Jaffa left between the consciousness of the Framers and the practice of judicial review today. The author argues that the understanding that Professor Jaffa brings to the intent of the Framers is one that opens up the Constitution to the call of justice, but the author critiques the utility of Professor Jaffa’s work in resolving the contentious constitutional issues of today, including abortion and capital punishment.

What Were The "Original Intentions" Of The Framers Of The Constitution Of The United States?, Harry V. Jaffa

Seattle University Law Review

This Article explains how the doctrine of original intent might be defended as the basis for interpreting the Constitution. The deepest political differences in American history have always been differences concerning the meaning of the Constitution, whether as originally intended, or as amended. Since the Civil War, the debate has often taken the form of a dispute over whether or not the Civil War amendments, notably the fourteenth, have changed the way in which the whole Constitution, and not only the amended parts, is read or interpreted. It is not possible to even discuss how or whether the Civil War …

The Eighteenth-Century Background Of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, William E. Nelson

Michigan Law Review

This analysis of Marshall's constitutional jurisprudence avoids the pitfalls of previous theories. It does not see the Federalist political program as the source of Marshall's constitutional doctrines and thus does not need to explain how Marshall qualified his political principles or how he convinced non-Federalist judges to accept them. Instead, this essay argues that legal, not political, principles underlay Marshall's jurisprudence, but it attempts to understand those principles in a manner consistent with the unavoidable twentieth-century assumption that law is a body of flexible rules responsive to social reality rather than a series of immutable, unambiguous doctrines derived from a …

Wasserstrom: The Judicial Decision- Toward A Theory Of Legal Justification, William B. Harvey

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Judicial Decision- Toward A Theory of Legal Justification By Richard A. Wasserstrom.

Reappraisal Of Federal Question Jurisdiction, G. Merle Bergman

Michigan Law Review

For some time I have been reading and listening to criticisms directed toward decisions which the Supreme Court has rendered in cases involving federal question jurisdiction. The general 'tenor of this criticism is that these decisions demonstrate a surprising lack of uniformity and conscious purpose. Writers profess to search in vain for sound logic in the Court's opinions. They point up instead the anomaly which is reflected when cases involving a substantial federal issue are tried in state courts, while those in which no real federal issue is involved are nevertheless accepted for trial in the federal courts. This result, …