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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Constitutional Law Of Interpretation, Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Bradford R. Clark
The Constitutional Law Of Interpretation, Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Bradford R. Clark
Notre Dame Law Review
The current debate over constitutional interpretation often proceeds on the assumption that the Constitution does not provide rules for its own interpretation. Accordingly, several scholars have attempted to identify applicable rules by consulting external sources that governed analogous legal texts (such as statutes, treaties, contracts, etc.). The distinctive function of the Constitution—often forgotten or overlooked—renders these analogies largely unnecessary. The Constitution was an instrument used by the people of the several States to transfer a fixed set of sovereign rights and powers from one group of sovereigns (the States) to another sovereign (the federal government), while maintaining the “States” as …
Debs And The Federal Equity Jurisdiction, Aditya Bamzai, Samuel L. Bray
Debs And The Federal Equity Jurisdiction, Aditya Bamzai, Samuel L. Bray
Notre Dame Law Review
The United States can sue for equitable relief without statutory authorization. The leading case on this question is In re Debs, and how to understand that case is of both historical and contemporary importance. Debs was a monumental opinion that prompted responses in the political platforms of major parties, presidential addresses, and enormous academic commentary. In the early twentieth century, Congress enacted several pieces of labor legislation that reduced Debs’s importance in the specific context of strikes. But in other contexts, the question whether the United States can bring suit in equity remains disputed to this day. The …
The Moral Authority Of Original Meaning, J. Joel Alicea
The Moral Authority Of Original Meaning, J. Joel Alicea
Notre Dame Law Review
One of the most enduring criticisms of originalism is that it lacks a sufficiently compelling moral justification. Scholars operating within the natural law tradition have been among the foremost critics of originalism’s morality, yet originalists have yet to offer a sufficient defense of originalism from within the natural law tradition that demonstrates that these critics are mistaken. That task has become more urgent in recent years due to Adrian Vermeule’s critique of originalism from within the natural law tradition, which has received greater attention than previous critiques. This Article is the first full-length response to the natural law critique of …
"A Sword In The Bed": Bringing An End To The Fusion Of Law And Equity, Brooks M. Chupp
"A Sword In The Bed": Bringing An End To The Fusion Of Law And Equity, Brooks M. Chupp
Notre Dame Law Review
Those who called for the fusion of law and equity have, throughout the years, argued that the existence of a parallel court system for equity would be inefficient and confusing for parties. While there is limited merit to this viewpoint, the United States has been willing to create courts of limited jurisdiction to hear cases of a highly specialized or technical nature in other areas of the law (for example, tax and bankruptcy). This Note argues that the specialized-courts approach is viable as it relates to equity and that it is, in fact, preferable to the current system. This Note …
Recovering Classical Legal Constitutionalism: A Critique Of Professor Vermeule's New Theory, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Kevin C. Walsh
Recovering Classical Legal Constitutionalism: A Critique Of Professor Vermeule's New Theory, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Kevin C. Walsh
Notre Dame Law Review
This Review proceeds in three Parts. Part I briefly summarizes Common Good Constitutionalism and provides a more detailed description of four of the book’s distinctive features. Part II critiques Vermeule’s argument in light of the classical tradition’s four essential aspects of law, namely that it is an ordinance of reason, for the common good, made by one who has care of the community, and promulgated. Part III draws on those reflections to respond to Vermeule’s criticisms of work like ours that argues that original-law-based understandings of the Constitution are at home in the classical legal tradition. A Conclusion briefly reflects …
Interpreting State Statutes In Federal Court, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl
Interpreting State Statutes In Federal Court, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl
Notre Dame Law Review
This Article addresses a problem that potentially arises whenever a federal court encounters a state statute. When interpreting the state statute, should the federal court use the state’s methods of statutory interpretation—the state’s canons of construction, its rules about the use of legislative history, and the like—or should the court instead use federal methods of statutory interpretation? The question is interesting as a matter of theory, and it is practically significant because different jurisdictions have somewhat different interpretive approaches. In addressing itself to this problem, the Article makes two contributions. First, it shows, as a normative matter, that federal courts …
Interring The Unitary Executive, Christine Kexel Chabot
Interring The Unitary Executive, Christine Kexel Chabot
Notre Dame Law Review
The President’s power to remove and control subordinate executive officers has sparked a constitutional debate that began in 1789 and rages on today. Leading originalists claim that the Constitution created a “unitary executive” President whose plenary removal power affords her “exclusive control” over subordinates’ exercise of executive power. Text assigning the President a removal power and exclusive control appears nowhere in the Constitution, however, and unitary scholars have instead relied on select historical understandings and negative inferences drawn from a supposed lack of independent regulatory structures at the Founding. The comprehensive historical record introduced by this Article lays this debate …