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Articles 1 - 25 of 25
Full-Text Articles in Law
Interpreting State Statutes In Federal Court, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl
Interpreting State Statutes In Federal Court, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl
Notre Dame Law Review
This Article addresses a problem that potentially arises whenever a federal court encounters a state statute. When interpreting the state statute, should the federal court use the state’s methods of statutory interpretation—the state’s canons of construction, its rules about the use of legislative history, and the like—or should the court instead use federal methods of statutory interpretation? The question is interesting as a matter of theory, and it is practically significant because different jurisdictions have somewhat different interpretive approaches. In addressing itself to this problem, the Article makes two contributions. First, it shows, as a normative matter, that federal courts …
Snap Removal: Concept; Cause; Cacophony; And Cure, Jeffrey W. Stempel, Thomas O. Main, David Mcclure
Snap Removal: Concept; Cause; Cacophony; And Cure, Jeffrey W. Stempel, Thomas O. Main, David Mcclure
Scholarly Works
So-called “snap removal” – removal of a case from state to federal court prior to service on a forum state defendant – has divided federal trial courts for 20 years. Recently, panels of the Second, Third and Fifth Circuits have sided with those supporting the tactic even though it conflicts with the general prohibition on removal when the case includes a forum state defendant, a situation historically viewed as eliminating the need to protect the outsider defendant from possible state court hostility.
Consistent with the public policy underlying diversity jurisdiction – availability of a federal forum to protect against defending …
Making Meaning: Towards A Narrative Theory Of Statutory Interpretation And Judicial Justification, Randy D. Gordon
Making Meaning: Towards A Narrative Theory Of Statutory Interpretation And Judicial Justification, Randy D. Gordon
Randy D. Gordon
The act of judging is complex involving finding facts, interpreting law, and then deciding a particular dispute. But these are not discreet functions: they bleed into one another and are thus interdependent. This article aims to reveal-at least in part-how judges approach this process. To do so, I look at three sets of civil RICO cases that align and diverge from civil antitrust precedents. I then posit that the judges in these cases base their decisions on assumptions about RICO's purpose. These assumptions, though often tacit and therefore not subject to direct observation, are nonetheless sometimes revealed when a judge …
To Promote Innovation, Congress Should Abolish The Supreme Court Created Exceptions To 35 U.S. Code Sec. 101, Shahrokh Falati
To Promote Innovation, Congress Should Abolish The Supreme Court Created Exceptions To 35 U.S. Code Sec. 101, Shahrokh Falati
Articles & Chapters
No abstract provided.
The Canon Wars, Anita S. Krishnakumar, Victoria Nourse
The Canon Wars, Anita S. Krishnakumar, Victoria Nourse
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Canons are taking their turn down the academic runway in ways that no one would have foretold just a decade ago. Affection for canons of construction has taken center stage in recent Supreme Court cases and in constitutional theory. Harvard Dean John Manning and originalists Will Baude and Stephen Sachs have all suggested that principles of “ordinary interpretation” including canons should inform constitutional interpretation. Given this newfound enthusiasm for canons, and their convergence in both constitutional and statutory law, it is not surprising that we now have two competing book-length treatments of the canons—one by Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner, …
Text Over Intent And The Demise Of Legislative History, Thomas W. Merrill, Michael S. Paulsen, Saikrishna Prakash, Lawrence B. Solum, Sandra Segal Ikuta
Text Over Intent And The Demise Of Legislative History, Thomas W. Merrill, Michael S. Paulsen, Saikrishna Prakash, Lawrence B. Solum, Sandra Segal Ikuta
Faculty Scholarship
The following is the transcript of a 2016 Federalist Society panel entitled: Text Over Intent and the Demise of Legislative History. The panel originally occurred on November 17, 2016 during the National Lawyers Convention in Washington, D.C. The participants were: Prof. Thomas W. Merrill, Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; Prof. Michael S. Paulsen, Distinguished University Chair and Professor, University of St. Thomas School of Law; Prof. Saikrishna Prakash, James Monroe Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law; Prof. Lawrence B. Solum, Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The moderator was …
Making Meaning: Towards A Narrative Theory Of Statutory Interpretation And Judicial Justification, Randy D. Gordon
Making Meaning: Towards A Narrative Theory Of Statutory Interpretation And Judicial Justification, Randy D. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
The act of judging is complex involving finding facts, interpreting law, and then deciding a particular dispute. But these are not discreet functions: they bleed into one another and are thus interdependent. This article aims to reveal-at least in part-how judges approach this process. To do so, I look at three sets of civil RICO cases that align and diverge from civil antitrust precedents. I then posit that the judges in these cases base their decisions on assumptions about RICO's purpose. These assumptions, though often tacit and therefore not subject to direct observation, are nonetheless sometimes revealed when a judge …
State-Action Immunity And Section 5 Of The Ftc Act, Daniel A. Crane, Adam Hester
State-Action Immunity And Section 5 Of The Ftc Act, Daniel A. Crane, Adam Hester
Michigan Law Review
The state-action immunity doctrine of Parker v. Brown immunizes anticompetitive state regulations from preemption by federal antitrust law so long as the state takes conspicuous ownership of its anticompetitive policy. In its 1943 Parker decision, the Supreme Court justified this doctrine, observing that no evidence of a congressional will to preempt state law appears in the Sherman Act’s legislative history or context. In addition, commentators generally assume that the New Deal court was anxious to avoid re-entangling the federal judiciary in Lochner-style substantive due process analysis. The Supreme Court has observed, without deciding, that the Federal Trade Commission might …
The Commonwealth Of Puerto Rico: Trying To Gain Dignity And Maintain Culture, Arnold Leibowitz
The Commonwealth Of Puerto Rico: Trying To Gain Dignity And Maintain Culture, Arnold Leibowitz
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
Export Controls - A Private Cause Of Action Under The Export Administration Act Of 1979, Wilbur Owens
Export Controls - A Private Cause Of Action Under The Export Administration Act Of 1979, Wilbur Owens
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
Intentionalism Justice Scalia Could Love, Hillel Y. Levin
Intentionalism Justice Scalia Could Love, Hillel Y. Levin
Scholarly Works
Book review of The Nature of Legislative Intent by Richard Ekins (Oxford 2012).
The Promises Of Freedom: The Contemporary Relevance Of The Thirteenth Amendment, William M. Carter Jr.
The Promises Of Freedom: The Contemporary Relevance Of The Thirteenth Amendment, William M. Carter Jr.
Articles
This article, an expanded version of the author's remarks at the 2013 Honorable Clifford Scott Green Lecture at the Temple University Beasley School of Law, illuminates the history and the context of the Thirteenth Amendment. This article contends that the full scope of the Thirteenth Amendment has yet to be realized and offers reflections on why it remains an underenforced constitutional norm. Finally, this article demonstrates the relevance of the Thirteenth Amendment to addressing contemporary forms of racial inequality and subordination.
Legal Process In A Box, Or What Class Action Waivers Teach Us About Law-Making, Rhonda Wasserman
Legal Process In A Box, Or What Class Action Waivers Teach Us About Law-Making, Rhonda Wasserman
Articles
The Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion advanced an agenda found in neither the text nor the legislative history of the Federal Arbitration Act. Concepcion provoked a maelstrom of reactions not only from the press and the academy, but also from Congress, federal agencies and lower courts, as they struggled to interpret, apply, reverse, or cabin the Court’s blockbuster decision. These reactions raise a host of provocative questions about the relationships among the branches of government and between the Supreme Court and the lower courts. Among other questions, Concepcion and its aftermath force us to grapple with the …
Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, And The Case Of Amar's Bill Of Rights, William Michael Treanor
Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, And The Case Of Amar's Bill Of Rights, William Michael Treanor
Michigan Law Review
Championed on the Supreme Court by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas and in academia most prominently by Professor Akhil Amar textualism has emerged within the past twenty years as a leading school of constitutional interpretation. Textualists argue that the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with its original public meaning, and in seeking that meaning, they closely parse the Constitution's words and grammar and the placement of clauses in the document. They have assumed that this close parsing recaptures original meaning, but, perhaps because it seems obviously correct, that assumption has neither been defended nor challenged. This Article uses Professor …
Review Essay: Using All Available Information, Max Huffman
Review Essay: Using All Available Information, Max Huffman
ExpressO
This is a review essay entitled “Using All Available Information,” in which I review and comment on Justice Stephen Breyer’s new book, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution, published in September 2005. Justice Breyer’s book, adapted from the Tanner Lectures given in 2005 at Harvard Law School, serves partly as a response to Justice Scalia’s 1997 volume A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law. I review Justice Breyer’s book in part by comparison to and contrast with Justice Scalia’s. I propose that much about Justice Breyer’s interpretive philosophy, which centers on determining the “purposes” of texts and interpreting …
Justice Scalia's Tax Jurisprudence, Stephen T. Black, Katherine D. Black
Justice Scalia's Tax Jurisprudence, Stephen T. Black, Katherine D. Black
Law Faculty Scholarship
Justice Scalia is an outspoken conservative acclaimed for his remarkable intellect and scholarship, and is noted for his adherence to the principle of judicial restraint. He pursues what he insists is an "originalist" path that relies on the Constitution's actual text in decision-making. He works hard to try to maintain constitutional interpretation that does not change from case to case.
So what happens when an "originalist"--concerned that Congress writes imprecise legislation and then leaves its interpretation and application in the hands of administrative agencies or, worse yet, the courts-is forced to deal with tax issues? This article takes a look …
Things Judges Do: State Statutory Interpretation, Judith S. Kaye
Things Judges Do: State Statutory Interpretation, Judith S. Kaye
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Chaotic Pseudotext, Paul F. Campos
Legislative History And Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court And The Tenth Circuit, Fritz Snyder
Legislative History And Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court And The Tenth Circuit, Fritz Snyder
Oklahoma Law Review
No abstract provided.
That Obscure Object Of Desire: Hermeneutics And The Autonomous Legal Text, Paul Campos
That Obscure Object Of Desire: Hermeneutics And The Autonomous Legal Text, Paul Campos
Publications
No abstract provided.
The Evolution Of Government Liability Under Section 1983., Christopher J.M. Pettit
The Evolution Of Government Liability Under Section 1983., Christopher J.M. Pettit
St. Mary's Law Journal
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in order to enforce the law, Congress shall have the power to pass enabling legislation. In the exercise of this power, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871, to implement the prohibition of slavery as required by the Thirteenth Amendment. Although the Thirteenth Amendment abolished the institution of slavery, discriminatory actions by private citizens remained prevalent. During the period following reconstruction, congressional legislation shifted focus from prohibiting state action to prohibiting the actions of private individuals who violated the civil liberties of others. Through the passage of the Civil Rights …
The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation, Inertial Burdens, And A Misleading Version Of Democracy, Jeffrey W. Stempel
The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation, Inertial Burdens, And A Misleading Version Of Democracy, Jeffrey W. Stempel
Scholarly Works
No one theory or school of thought consistently dominates judicial application of statutes, but the basic methodology employed by courts seems well-established if not always well-defined. Most mainstream judges and lawyers faced with a statutory construction task will look at (although with varying emphasis) the text of the statute, the legislative history of the provision, the context of the enactment, evident congressional purpose, and applicable agency interpretations, often employing the canons of construction for assistance. Although orthodox judicial thought suggests that the judge's role is confined to discerning textual meaning or directives of the enacting legislature, courts also often examine …
Statutory Interpretation In America: Dipping Into Legislative History, Part Ii, Reed Dickerson
Statutory Interpretation In America: Dipping Into Legislative History, Part Ii, Reed Dickerson
Articles by Maurer Faculty
No abstract provided.
Statutory Interpretation In America: Dipping Into Legislative History, Part I, Reed Dickerson
Statutory Interpretation In America: Dipping Into Legislative History, Part I, Reed Dickerson
Articles by Maurer Faculty
No abstract provided.
Statutory Interpretation: Dipping Into Legislative History, Reed Dickerson
Statutory Interpretation: Dipping Into Legislative History, Reed Dickerson
Articles by Maurer Faculty
No abstract provided.