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Full-Text Articles in Law
Factors, Scott Rempell
The Principle Of Party Presentation, Jeffrey M. Anderson
The Principle Of Party Presentation, Jeffrey M. Anderson
Buffalo Law Review
Our adversarial system of adjudication is characterized by active parties and (relatively) passive judges; the parties identify the issues in dispute, and the judge decides those issues. Sua sponte decision-making—whereby a judge raises and decides new issues not presented by the parties—undermines this adversarial system. For decades, courts and commentators have struggled to explain when sua sponte decision-making may be appropriate. That issue was particularly important to the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who has been described as “The Great Proceduralist.” In a series of oral arguments and opinions during her tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg repeatedly invoked …
Statutory Interpretation And Chevron Deference In The Appellate Courts: An Empirical Analysis, Amy Semet
Statutory Interpretation And Chevron Deference In The Appellate Courts: An Empirical Analysis, Amy Semet
Journal Articles
What statutory methods does an appellate court use in reviewing decisions of an administrative agency? Further, in doing this review, are appellate judges more likely to use certain statutory methods when they expressly cite the Chevron two-step framework than if they do not? This Article explores the answers to these questions using an original database of over 200 statutory interpretation cases culled from more than 2,500 cases decided in appellate courts reviewing National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board) adjudications from 1994 through 2020. In particular, the study examined the use of text, language canons, substantive canons, legislative history, …
The Conceptual Problems Arising From Legal Pluralism, Jorge Luis Fabra-Zamora
The Conceptual Problems Arising From Legal Pluralism, Jorge Luis Fabra-Zamora
Journal Articles
This paper argues that analytical jurisprudence has been insufficiently attentive to three significant puzzles highlighted by the legal pluralist tradition: the existence of commonalities between different types of law, the possibility of a distinction between law and non-law, and the explanatory centrality of the state. I further argue that the resolution of these questions sets the stage for a renewed agenda of analytical jurisprudence and has to be considered in attempts for reconciliation between the academic traditions of analytical jurisprudence and legal pluralism, often called “pluralist jurisprudence.” I also argue that the resolution of these problems affects the empirical, doctrinal, …