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Full-Text Articles in Law

When Should Original Meanings Matter?, Richard A. Primus Jan 2008

When Should Original Meanings Matter?, Richard A. Primus

Articles

Constitutional theory lacks an account of when each of the familiar sources of authority-text, original meaning, precedent, and so on-should be given weight. The dominant tendency is to regard all sources as potentially applicable in every case. In contrast, this Article proposes that each source of authority is pertinent in some categories of cases but not in others, much as a physical tool is appropriate for some but not all kinds of household tasks. The Article then applies this approach to identify the categories of cases in which original meaning is, or is not, a valid factor in constitutional decisionmaking.


"The Threes": Re-Imagining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, Chris Guthrie, Tracey E. George Jan 2008

"The Threes": Re-Imagining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, Chris Guthrie, Tracey E. George

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In this Essay--the first in a series of essays designed to reimagine the Supreme Court--we argue that Congress should authorize the Court to adopt, in whole or part, panel decision making... With respect to the prospect of different Court outcomes, we demonstrate empirically in this Essay that the vast majority of cases decided during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries--including "Grutter", "Roe", and "Bush v. Gore" --would have come out the same way if the Court had decided them in panels rather than as a full Court.


Back To The Beginning: An Essay On The Court, The Law Of Democracy, And Trust, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer Jan 2008

Back To The Beginning: An Essay On The Court, The Law Of Democracy, And Trust, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer

Articles by Maurer Faculty

The law of democracy is in a state of incoherence. The experiment begun by Baker v. Carr showed great promise yet soon gave way to disappointment. The promise was one of modest review and respect for political choices made elsewhere. A presumption was still against judicial involvement: absent self-entrenchment or distrust of political outcomes, the Court would stay its hand. But, the reality has been far from that. The presumption has now clearly shifted, and the Court intervenes in politically-charged controversies as a matter of course. This raises a question at the heart of the law of democracy: can we …


Climate Change In The Supreme Court, Lisa Heinzerling Jan 2008

Climate Change In The Supreme Court, Lisa Heinzerling

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of climate change for the first time. The Court held that the Clean Air Act gives the Environmental Protection Agency the authority to regulate greenhouse gases and that the agency may not decline to exercise this authority based either on factors not present in the statute or inconclusive gestures toward uncertainty in the science of climate change. I had the privilege of serving as the lead author of the winning briefs in this case. This Article provides an insider's perspective on the choices that went into bringing and …


Judicial Compensation And The Definition Of Judicial Power In The Early Republic, James E. Pfander Jan 2008

Judicial Compensation And The Definition Of Judicial Power In The Early Republic, James E. Pfander

Michigan Law Review

Article III's provision for the compensation of federal judges has been much celebrated for the no-diminution provision that forecloses judicial pay cuts. But other features of Article Ill's compensation provision have largely escaped notice. In particular, little attention has been paid to the framers' apparent expectation that Congress would compensate federal judges with salaries alone, payable from the treasury at stated times. Article III's presumption in favor of salary-based compensation may rule out fee-based compensation, which was a common form of judicial compensation in England and the colonies but had grown controversial by the time of the framing. Among other …


Symposium: Stare Decisis And Nonjudicial Actors: Introduction, Amy Coney Barrett Jan 2008

Symposium: Stare Decisis And Nonjudicial Actors: Introduction, Amy Coney Barrett

Journal Articles

This essay is as an introduction to a symposium on stare decisis and nonjudicial actors. It frames the questions explored in the symposium by pausing to reflect upon the variety of ways in which nonjudicial actors have, over time, registered their disagreement with decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Both public officials and private citizens have battled the Court on any number of occasions since its inception, and historically, they have employed a diverse range of tactics in doing so. They have resisted Supreme Court judgments. They have denied the binding effect of Supreme Court opinions. They have sought …