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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Ambiguity And Unfairness Of Dismissing Bad Writing, Benjamin D. Raker
The Ambiguity And Unfairness Of Dismissing Bad Writing, Benjamin D. Raker
Cleveland State Law Review
Courts routinely choose to explicitly dismiss arguments and issues raised by parties, regardless of their merit, based on unexplained determinations that the briefing was bad. This practice, which I call abandonment by poor presentation, is sometimes justified by practicality, by pointing to federal and local rules, by waiver and forfeiture doctrines, and by the norm of party presentation. None of these justifications hold water. I contend that the real reason judges find abandonment by poor presentation is agenda control: judges rely on the practice as a means of retaining control over how they decide cases. This unexplained, poorly justified, and …
Choosing A Court To Review The Executive, Joseph Mead, Nicholas Fromherz
Choosing A Court To Review The Executive, Joseph Mead, Nicholas Fromherz
All Maxine Goodman Levin School of Urban Affairs Publications
For more than one hundred years, Congress has experimented with review of agency action by single-judge district courts, multiple-judge district courts, and direct review by circuit courts. This tinkering has not given way to a stable design. Rather than settling on a uniform scheme—or at least a scheme with a discernible organizing principle—Congress has left litigants with a jurisdictional maze that varies unpredictably across and within statutes and agencies.In this Article, we offer a fresh look at the theoretical and empirical factors that ought to inform the allocation of the judicial power between district and circuit courts in suits challenging …
Choosing A Court To Review The Executive, Joseph Mead, Nicholas Fromherz
Choosing A Court To Review The Executive, Joseph Mead, Nicholas Fromherz
Law Faculty Articles and Essays
For more than one hundred years, Congress has experimented with review of agency action by single-judge district courts, multiple-judge district courts, and direct review by circuit courts. This tinkering has not given way to a stable design. Rather than settling on a uniform scheme—or at least a scheme with a discernible organizing principle— Congress has left litigants with a jurisdictional maze that varies unpredictably across and within statutes and agencies.
In this Article, we offer a fresh look at the theoretical and empirical factors that ought to inform the allocation of the judicial power between district and circuit courts in …