Law Commons^™

Separation Of Powers Doctrine On The Modern Supreme Court And Four Doctrinal Approaches To Judicial Decision-Making, R. Randall Kelso

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Interpretation And Institutions, Cass R. Sunstein, Adrian Vermeule

Michigan Law Review

Suppose that a statute, enacted several decades ago, bans the introduction of any color additive in food if that additive "causes cancer" in human beings or animals. Suppose that new technologies, able to detect low-level carcinogens, have shown that many potential additives cause cancer, even though the statistical risk is often tiny - akin to the risk of eating two peanuts with governmentally-permitted levels of aflatoxins. Suppose, finally, that a company seeks to introduce a certain color additive into food, acknowledging that the additive causes cancer, but urging that the risk is infinitesimal, and that if the statutory barrier were …

Why Theories Of Law Have Little Or Nothing To Do With Judicial Restraint, Philip E. Soper

Articles

The question I explore here, stated in its broadest form, is this: What is the connection between theory and practice between academic claims about how judges should decide cases and the actual behavior of judges as revealed in the opinions they write? More particularly, do theories about the nature of law have any implications for the question whether a judge should adopt an "activist" or a "restrained" approach to deciding cases? As you might infer from my title, I defend here what I call "the skeptical thesis" in answer to both the general and particular questions. Judges pay little or …

Dworkin's Domain, Philip E. Soper

Reviews

No one has done more in the last twenty years to revitalize debates about how judges should and do decide cases than Ronald Dworkin. At the same time, no one has been more equivocal than Dworkin in explaining how a theory of adjudication bears on the dispute within legal theory about the connection between law and morality. This fine book continues both traditions.

Legal Theory And The Obligation Of A Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, Philip Soper

Book Chapters

Confronted with standards beyond those obvious in purpose and rule, the positivist, says Dworkin, has two choices. He must either claim that such standards are only discretionary and hence not legally binding, or he may concede their binding status and argue that he identifies them as legal standards through reference, in some more complex way, to his theoretical master test.

There is, however, a third possibility. The positivist might admit that some standards bind judges but explain that they play a role in the legal system sufficiently different from that of ordinary rules and principles to justify excluding them from …

Recent Books, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

This department undertakes to note or review briefly current books on law and matters closely related thereto.