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Judges

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Columbia Law School

Textualism

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Full-Text Articles in Law

When Judges Were Enjoined: Text And Tradition In The Federal Review Of State Judicial Action, Alexandra Nickerson, Kellen R. Funk Jan 2023

When Judges Were Enjoined: Text And Tradition In The Federal Review Of State Judicial Action, Alexandra Nickerson, Kellen R. Funk

Faculty Scholarship

It is virtually a tenet of modern federal jurisdiction that judges, at least when they are acting as judges, are inappropriate defendants in civil suits. Yet on rare but salient occasions, state judges might be the sole or primary party responsible for violating the constitutional rights of citizens, for instance by imposing excessive bail or by opening their courtrooms to oppressive private suits like those under Texas’s Senate Bill 8 bounty regime. In such cases, injunctive relief against judicial officers may be the only or most effective remedy against constitutional violations, but federal courts from the trial level up to …


Complexity, Judgment, And Restraint, Gerard E. Lynch Jan 2020

Complexity, Judgment, And Restraint, Gerard E. Lynch

Faculty Scholarship

I am honored to have been asked to give this year’s James Madison Lecture. I hesitate to single out any of my extraordinary predecessors at this podium – there are too many great judges to list, and too much risk of slighting any. So I will note only that the list includes both judges for whom I clerked more than forty years ago, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., and Chief Judge Wilfred Feinberg, of the court on which I now serve. That long-ago law clerk could not have dreamed of being someday in a position once occupied by those two …


Legitimate Interpretation – Or Legitimate Adjudication?, Thomas W. Merrill Jan 2020

Legitimate Interpretation – Or Legitimate Adjudication?, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

Current debate about the legitimacy of lawmaking by courts focuses on what constitutes legitimate interpretation. The debate has reached an impasse in that originalism and textualism appear to have the stronger case as a matter of theory while living constitutionalism and dynamic interpretation provide much account of actual practice. This Article argues that if we refocus the debate by asking what constitutes legitimate adjudication, as determined by the social practice of the parties and their lawyers who take part in adjudication, it is possible to develop an account of legitimacy that produces a much better fit between theory and practice. …