Law Commons^™

Is Jus In Bello In Crisis?, Jens Ohlin

Jens David Ohlin

It is a truism that new technologies are remaking the tactical and legal landscape of armed conflict. While such statements are undoubtedly true, it is important to separate genuine trends from scholarly exaggeration. The following essay, an introduction to the Drone Wars symposium of the Journal, catalogues today’s most pressing disputes regarding international humanitarian law (IHL) and their consequences for criminal responsibility. These include: (i) the triggering and classification of armed conflicts with non-state actors; (ii) the relative scope of IHL and international human rights law in asymmetrical conflicts; (iii) the targeting of suspected terrorists under concept- or status-based classifications …

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Legitimate Weapon Systems Or Unlawful Angels Of Death?, Michael J. Deegan

Pace International Law Review

Since the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States has utilized Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to locate, surveil and kill members of the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and its associated forces. Such killings have decimated the leadership of these groups and disrupted their operations. However, there are collateral effects from UAV killings including civilian deaths. These deaths increase resentment and hatred toward the US, which is channeled by terrorist groups to recruit new members and for local support. Moreover, targeted killings outside a combat zone have political and diplomatic consequences. This paper argues that the current uses of UAV are legal under international …

Charting The Legal Geography Of Non-International Armed Conflict, Michael N. Schmitt

International Law Studies

This article examines the geographical reach of international humanitarian law (law of armed conflict), particularly during armed conflicts between States and non-State organized armed groups. The issue is operationally critical, since to the extent that IHL applies, practices which are lawful during armed conflicts, such as status-based targeting, may be employed. When IHL does not apply, human rights obligations shouldered by the State govern the conduct of its military operations. The article surveys the various approaches to the the legal geography of non-international armed conflict, arguing that an interpretation by which IHL is not geographically restricted is the most supportable.

Duck-Rabbits And Drones: Legal Indeterminacy In The War On Terror, Rosa Brooks

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In the days and weeks immediately following the 9/11 attacks, “the law” offered little to lawyers or policy-makers looking for guidance. Indeed, for many the events of 9/11 became the legal equivalent of a Rorschach test: depending on the observer, the 9/11 attacks were variously construed as criminal acts, acts of war, or something in between, thus fitting into (or triggering) any of several radically different legal regimes.

Divergent interpretations of the law are common, of course. Legal rules often contain an element of ambiguity, and the “facts” to which law must be applied can frequently be construed in multiple …

Cross-Border Targeted Killings: "Lawful But Awful"?, Rosa Brooks

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Since September 11, the United States has waged two very open wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. These two wars have killed nearly 7,000 U.S. military personnel and left some 50,000 American troops wounded; they have also left an unknown number of Iraqi and Afghan soldiers and civilians dead or wounded. But alongside these two costly and visible wars, the United States has also been waging what amounts to a third war.

This third war is a secret war, waged mostly by drone strikes, though it has also involved a smaller number of special operations raids. The author calls this third …

The Judge And The Drone, Justin Desautels-Stein

Publications

Among the most characteristic issues in modern jurisprudence is the distinction between adjudication and legislation. In the some accounts, a judge's role in deciding a particular controversy is highly constrained and limited to the application of preexisting law. Whereas legislation is inescapably political, adjudication requires at least some form of impersonal neutrality. In various ways over the past century, theorists have pressed this conventional account, complicating the conceptual underpinnings of the distinction between law-application and lawmaking. This Article contributes to this literature on the nature of adjudication through the resuscitation of a structuralist mode of legal interpretation. In the structuralist …