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Full-Text Articles in Law
Property In Law: Government Rights In Legal Innovations, Stephen Clowney
Property In Law: Government Rights In Legal Innovations, Stephen Clowney
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles
One of the most enduring themes in American political thought is that competition between states encourages legal innovation. Despite the prominence of this story in the national ideology, there is growing anxiety that state and local governments innovate at a socially suboptimal rate. Academics have recently expressed alarm that the pace of legal experimentation has become "extraordinarily slow," "inefficient," and "less than ideal." Ordinary citizens, too, seem concerned that government has been leeched of imagination and the dynamic spirit of experimentation; both talk radio programs and newspapers remain jammed with complaints about legislative gridlock and do-nothing politicians who cannot, or …
Copyright As Property In The Post-Industrial Economy: A Research Agenda, Julie E. Cohen
Copyright As Property In The Post-Industrial Economy: A Research Agenda, Julie E. Cohen
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The incentives-for-authors formulation of copyright’s purpose is so deeply ingrained in our discourse and our thought processes that it is astonishingly hard to avoid invoking, even when one is consciously trying not to do so. Yet avoiding that formulation is exactly what we ought to be doing. Everything we know about creativity and creative processes suggests that copyright plays very little role in motivating creative work. In the contemporary information society, the purpose of copyright is to enable the provision of capital and organization so that creative work may be exploited. And the choice of copyright as a principal means …
Making Coasean Property More Coasean, Thomas W. Merrill, Henry E. Smith
Making Coasean Property More Coasean, Thomas W. Merrill, Henry E. Smith
Faculty Scholarship
In his pioneering work on transaction costs, Ronald Coase presupposed a picture of property as a bundle of government-prescribed use rights. Not only is this picture not essential to Coase’s purpose, but its limitations emerge when we apply Coase’s central insights to analyze the structure of property itself. This leads to the Coase corollary: in a world of zero transaction costs, the nature of property does not matter to allocative efficiency. However, as with the Coase theorem, the real implication is for our world of positive transaction costs: we need to subject the notion of property to a comparative institutional …