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Full-Text Articles in Law
Can Dna Be Speech?, Jorge R. Roig
Can Dna Be Speech?, Jorge R. Roig
Jorge R Roig
The Emergence Of Classical American Patent Law, Herbert Hovenkamp
The Emergence Of Classical American Patent Law, Herbert Hovenkamp
Herbert Hovenkamp
The Emergence of Classical Patent Law
Abstract
One enduring historical debate concerns whether the American Constitution was intended to be "classical" -- referring to a theory of statecraft that maximizes the role of private markets and minimizes the role of government in economic affairs. The most central and powerful proposition of classical constitutionalism is that the government's role in economic development should be minimal. First, private rights in property and contract exist prior to any community needs for development. Second, if a particular project is worthwhile the market itself will make it occur. Third, when the government attempts to induce …
The Classical Constitution, Herbert Hovenkamp
The Classical Constitution, Herbert Hovenkamp
Herbert Hovenkamp
Conservative and libertarian constitutional writers have often pined for return to a "classical" understanding of American federal and state Constitutions. "Classical" does not necessarily mean "originalist" or "interpretivist." Some classical views, such as the attempt to revitalize Lochner-style economic due process, find little support in the text of the federal Constitution or any of the contemporary state constitutions. Rather, constitutional meaning is thought to lie in a background link between constitution formation and classical statecraft. The core theory rests on the assumption of a social contract to which everyone in some initial position agreed. Like any contract, it would …
Inventing The Classical Constitution, Herbert Hovenkamp
Inventing The Classical Constitution, Herbert Hovenkamp
Herbert Hovenkamp
One recurring call over a century of American constitutional thought is for return to a “classical” understanding of American federal and state Constitutions. “Classical” does not necessarily mean “originalist” or “interpretivist." Some classical views, such as the attempt to revitalize Lochner-style economic due process, find little support in the text of the federal Constitution or any of the contemporary state constitutions. Rather, constitutional meaning is thought to lie in a background link between constitution formation and classical statecraft. The core theory rests on the assumption of a social contract to which everyone in some initial position agreed. Like any …
The "Progress Clause": An Empirical Analysis Based On The Constitutional Foundation Of Patent Law, Lori Andrews
The "Progress Clause": An Empirical Analysis Based On The Constitutional Foundation Of Patent Law, Lori Andrews
Lori B. Andrews
E Unum Pluribus: The Limitations On State Law Because Of Foreign Policy Uses Of State Law As A Gap Filler To Meet The International Obligations Of The United States, Llewellyn Gibbons
E Unum Pluribus: The Limitations On State Law Because Of Foreign Policy Uses Of State Law As A Gap Filler To Meet The International Obligations Of The United States, Llewellyn Gibbons
Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons
Unlike many nations where the ratification of a treaty immediately changes its internal laws, in the United States, unless the language of the treaty is self-executing, Congress must affirmatively change domestic laws to conform to the obligations of the treaty. Increasing, it is a modern trend for the United States to represent in international forums that the United States is in conformity with its international obligations because of state statutes or because of common law court decisions. This article looks whether the foreign policy representations of the United States to other countries (in the context of the international intellectual property …
Why Copyright Law Lacks Taste And Scents, Leon R. Calleja
Why Copyright Law Lacks Taste And Scents, Leon R. Calleja
Leon R Calleja
This paper explores the resistance in U.S. copyright law to extend copyright protection to scents and tastes, and advances the position that copyright law’s originality and expression requirements limit copyrightable subject matter to expressions that engage both author and audience in a way that requires reflection upon the work—or at least, the capacity for reflection—in a necessarily intersubjective and communicative fashion, what I call a “public dimension.” That the sensations of taste and smell are inescapably immediate and private suggest that they lack the kind of public dimension that visual and audio works exhibit. Indeed, this creates an ineffability characterized …
Calibrating Copyright Statutory Damages To Promote Speech, Alan Garfield
Calibrating Copyright Statutory Damages To Promote Speech, Alan Garfield
Alan E Garfield
Copyright and the First Amendment exist in tension. The Supreme Court acknowledges this tension but says that copyright law resolves it with two built-in free speech safeguards: (1) by protecting only the expression of ideas and not the ideas themselves (the idea/expression dichotomy); and (2) by allowing the use of expression under certain circumstances (the fair use doctrine). The problem is that these doctrines are notoriously vague, so users often cannot know ex ante whether their uses will be immune from liability. This unpredictably might be tolerable if users could be confident that, if they were subject to liability, any …
Chasing 'Enemy Combatants' And Circumventing International Law: A License For Sanctioned Abuse, Peter J. Honigsberg
Chasing 'Enemy Combatants' And Circumventing International Law: A License For Sanctioned Abuse, Peter J. Honigsberg
Peter J Honigsberg
In 1944, in Korematsu v. United States, the Supreme Court made a major error in judgment. It ruled that the executive may forcibly remove over 110,000 Japanese Americans from their homes and relocate them in American detention camps. In two recent Supreme Court cases, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the court made similar errors in judgment by accepting the administration's term "enemy combatant." The Supreme Court's errors were compounded when Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006 in October, 2006, statutorily defining the term enemy combatant for the first time. By acknowledging the term enemy combatant, the …