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A Framework For Evaluating Willingness Of Frand Licensees, Jorge L. Contreras
A Framework For Evaluating Willingness Of Frand Licensees, Jorge L. Contreras
Utah Law Faculty Scholarship
An increasing number of cases around the world turn on whether a manufacturer of a product – e.g., a smartphone, a tablet or a car -- (an “implementer”) is willing to pay a “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND) royalty for patents that are essential to an industry standard embodied in that product (standards-essential patents or SEPs). This determination is important both to the analysis of the appropriateness of an injunction under the 4-factor eBay test in the U.S., and for assessing the appropriateness of injunctive relief under the Huawei v. ZTE competition law case in the EU. This essay explores …
Brief Of Amicus Curiae Professor Jorge L. Contreras In Support Of Appellee And Affirmance In Ftc V. Qualcomm, Jorge L. Contreras
Brief Of Amicus Curiae Professor Jorge L. Contreras In Support Of Appellee And Affirmance In Ftc V. Qualcomm, Jorge L. Contreras
Utah Law Faculty Scholarship
Qualcomm participated in the development of 3G and 4G wireless telecommunication standards under the auspices of two SDOs, the Telecommunications Industry Association (“TIA”) and the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (“ATIS”). Each of these SDOs had adopted intellectual property rights policies (IPR Policies) that required their participants to grant licenses of SEPs to implementers of their standards on FRAND terms. Yet, over the course of several years, Qualcomm refused to license its SEPs to numerous actual and potential modem chip rivals including MediaTek, Project Dragonfly (a joint venture of NTT DoCoMo, Samsung and several Japanese manufacturers), Samsung, VIA Telecom, Intel, …
Much Ado About Holdup, Jorge L. Contreras
Much Ado About Holdup, Jorge L. Contreras
Utah Law Faculty Scholarship
The policy debate surrounding patent hold-up in markets for standardized products is now well into its second decade with no end in sight. Fundamental questions including the definition of hold-up, whether it exists in the marketplace, and what impact it has on innovation, continue to bedevil scholars, policy makers and industry. Yet it is not clear that this debate needs to continue. Patent hold-up is a pattern of market behavior, not a legally-cognizable wrong. Whether it is commonplace or rare is largely irrelevant to liability in any given case. To the extent that hold-up behavior constitutes an abuse of market …