Law Commons^™

Defragging Feminist Cyberlaw, Amanda Levendowski

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In 1996, Judge Frank Easterbrook famously observed that any effort to create a field called cyberlaw would be “doomed to be shallow and miss unifying principles.” He was wrong, but not for the reason other scholars have stated. Feminism is a unifying principle of cyberlaw, which alternately amplifies and abridges the feminist values of consent, safety, and accessibility. Cyberlaw simply hasn’t been understood that way—until now.

In computer science, “defragging” means bringing together disparate pieces of data so they are easier to access. Inspired by that process, this Article offers a new approach to cyberlaw that illustrates how feminist values …

Dystopian Trademark Revelations, Amanda Levendowski

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Uncovering dystopian technologies is challenging. Nondisclosure agreements, procurement policies, trade secrets, and strategic obfuscation collude to shield the development and deployment of these technologies from public scrutiny until it is too late to combat them with law or policy. But occasionally, exposing dystopian technologies is simple. Corporations choose technology trademarks inspired by dystopian philosophies and novels or similar elements of real life—all warnings that their potential uses are dystopian as well. That pronouncement is not necessarily trumpeted on social media or corporate websites, however. It is revealed in a more surprising place: trademark registrations at the U.S. Patent and Trademark …

Resisting Face Surveillance With Copyright Law, Amanda Levendowski

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Face surveillance is animated by deep-rooted demographic and deployment biases that endanger marginalized communities and threaten the privacy of all. But current approaches have not prevented its adoption by law enforcement. Some companies have offered voluntary moratoria on selling the technology, leaving many others to fill in the gaps. Legislators have enacted regulatory oversight at the state and city levels, but a federal ban remains elusive. Both approaches require vast shifts in practical and political will, each with drawbacks. While we wait, face surveillance persists. This Article suggests a new possibility: face surveillance is fueled by unauthorized copies and reproductions …

Trademarks As Surveillance Transparency, Amanda Levendowski

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

We know very little about the technologies that watch us. From cell site simulators to predictive policing algorithms, the lack of transparency around surveillance technologies makes it difficult for the public to engage in meaningful oversight. Legal scholars have critiqued various corporate and law enforcement justifications for surveillance opacity, including contract and intellectual property law. But the public needs a free, public, and easily accessible source of information about corporate technologies that might be used to watch us. To date, the literature has overlooked a free, extensive, and easily accessible source of information about surveillance technologies hidden in plain sight: …

From Lex Informatica To The Control Revolution, Julie E. Cohen

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Legal scholarship on the encounter between networked digital technologies and law has focused principally on how legal and policy processes should respond to new technological developments and has spent much less time considering what that encounter might signify for the shape of legal institutions themselves. This essay focuses on the latter question. Within fields like technology studies, labor history, and economic sociology, there is a well-developed tradition of studying the ways that new information technologies and the “control revolution” they enabled—in brief, a quantum leap in the capacity for highly granular oversight and management—have elicited long-term, enduring changes in the …

Turning Privacy Inside Out, Julie E. Cohen

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The problem of theorizing privacy moves on two levels, the first consisting of an inadequate conceptual vocabulary and the second consisting of an inadequate institutional grammar. Privacy rights are supposed to protect individual subjects, and so conventional ways of understanding privacy are subject-centered, but subject-centered approaches to theorizing privacy also wrestle with deeply embedded contradictions. And privacy’s most enduring institutional failure modes flow from its insistence on placing the individual and individualized control at the center. Strategies for rescuing privacy from irrelevance involve inverting both established ways of talking about privacy rights and established conventions for designing institutions to protect …

The Biopolitical Public Domain: The Legal Construction Of The Surveillance Economy, Julie E. Cohen

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Within the political economy of informational capitalism, commercial surveillance practices are tools for resource extraction. That process requires an enabling legal construct, which this essay identifies and explores. Contemporary practices of personal information processing constitute a new type of public domain — a repository of raw materials that are there for the taking and that are framed as inputs to particular types of productive activity. As a legal construct, the biopolitical public domain shapes practices of appropriation and use of personal information in two complementary and interrelated ways. First, it constitutes personal information as available and potentially valuable: as a …

What Privacy Is For, Julie E. Cohen

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Privacy has an image problem. Over and over again, regardless of the forum in which it is debated, it is cast as old-fashioned at best and downright harmful at worst — anti-progressive, overly costly, and inimical to the welfare of the body politic. Yet the perception of privacy as antiquated and socially retrograde is wrong. It is the result of a conceptual inversion that relates to the way in which the purpose of privacy has been conceived. Like the broader tradition of liberal political theory within which it is situated, legal scholarship has conceptualized privacy as a form of protection …