Law Commons^™

Property As Institutions For Resources: Lessons From And For Ip, Julie E. Cohen

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The idea of property in land as the paradigm case of property exercises despotic dominion over property thinking. From the perspective of evolving political economy, however, a land-centric model of property makes very little sense. Property institutions coordinate access to resources, and so it is reasonable to expect them to differ in ways that respond to the characteristics of those resources. The debate about whether intellectual property (IP) is property is instructive. IP scholars have pursued the property debate using a conceptual framework derived from common law real property doctrines and organized around the practical and theoretical problems associated with …

[Un]Happy Together: Why The Supremacy Clause Preempts State Law Digital Performance Rights In Radio-Like Streaming Of Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, Julie L. Ross

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Lovers of the music of Frank Sinatra, Elvis Presley, Etta James, and hundreds of other recording artists whose records were made before February 15, 1972, may soon have a hard time hearing these great artists on any satellite or Internet radio service. Recently, two federal district courts have found that state laws were violated when satellite radio broadcaster Sirius XM Radio included pre-1972 sound recordings in its broadcasts without the owners’ permission, but these courts did not consider-–and the parties did not argue-–how the Supremacy Clause applies to those state law claims. This article argues that state laws purporting to …

The Zombie First Amendment, Julie E. Cohen

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Scholarly and popular critiques of contemporary free speech jurisprudence have noted an attitude of unquestioning deference to the political power of money. Rather than sheltering the ability to speak truth to power, they have lamented, the contemporary first amendment shelters power’s ability to make and propagate its own truth. This essay relates developments in recent first amendment jurisprudence to a larger struggle now underway to shape the distribution of information power in the era of informational capitalism. In particular, it argues that cases about political speech — cases that lie at the first amendment’s traditional core — tell only a …

Content, Purpose, Or Both?, Rebecca Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Most debates about the proper meaning of “transformativeness” in fair use are really about a larger shift towards more robust fair use. Part I of this short Article explores the copyright-restrictionist turn towards defending fair use, whereas in the past critics of copyright’s broad scope were more likely to argue that fair use was too fragile to protect free speech and creativity in the digital age. Part II looks at some of the major cases supporting that rhetorical and political shift. Although it hasn’t broken decisively with the past, current case law makes more salient the freedoms many types of …

Free To Be You And Me? Copyright And Constraint, Rebecca Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Joseph P. Fishman’s Creating Around Copyright advances a provocative thesis: some restrictions on creativity can spur the development of additional creative solutions, and (some level of) copyright might be one of those restrictions. If Picasso was right that “forcing yourself to use restricted means is the sort of restraint that liberates invention,” then being forced by law to use restricted means might do the same thing, ultimately leading to more varied and thus more valuable works.

At the outset, it’s important to know the baseline against which we ought to evaluate Fishman’s claims. Most copyright restrictionists, of whom I count …

The Romantic Author And The Romance Writer: Resisting Gendered Concepts Of Creativity, Rebecca Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Dominant narratives of creativity regularly expect female-associated forms of creativity to be provisioned naturally without need for the economic incentives provided by exclusive rights, just like housework and childcare. Even as the concept of Romantic authorship has come under sustained analytic assault, its challengers often look elsewhere–to the kinds of creativity in which men are more likely to participate–to find models of situated, always-influenced authorship. In this chapter, I examine one variant of the problem, in which certain arguments about copyright discount the value of forms that are predominantly produced and enjoyed by women. But creative works in these oft-denigrated …

A Mask That Eats Into The Face: Images And The Right Of Publicity, Rebecca Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In their eagerness to reward celebrities for the power of their “images,” and to prevent other people from exploiting those images, courts have allowed the right of publicity to distort the First Amendment. The power of the visual image has allowed courts to create an inconsistent, overly expansive regime that would be easily understood as constitutionally unacceptable were the same rules applied to written words as to drawings and video games. The intersection of a conceptually unbounded right with a category of objects that courts do not handle well has created deep inconsistencies and biases in the treatment of visual …

What's The Harm Of Trademark Infringement?, Rebecca Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

For decades, the concept of actionable trademark infringement has been expanding. Source confusion, reverse confusion, approval/affiliation confusion, initial interest confusion, post-sale confusion, endorsement confusion, and so on, all have won cases for plaintiffs. Whether or not the confusion cost the plaintiff any sales, or was in any way material to consumers, our concept of trademark infringement now encompasses it. These expansions occurred for reasons that seemed sufficient to courts at the time, when advocates offered theories about how all these kinds of confusion could cause harm to the trademark owner. Primarily, courts feared that non-competing uses would preclude trademark owners …