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Letter From Professor Timothy J. Brennan, Timothy J. Brennan
Letter From Professor Timothy J. Brennan, Timothy J. Brennan
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Dear Wendy,
Thanks for sending me the recent pair of articles. I just had a chance to read them today while I'm getting my furnace and AC replaced. I enjoyed them very much, both for the chance to think about copyright issues and to read yet again your creative and insightful approach to them.
The most intriguing thing about the Dayton piece was the asymmetric mar- ket failure idea. (I'll come back to the prisoners' dilemma in connection with the LCP paper!) Your point that justifying copyright requires the belief that intellectual property markets won't work without copyright and that …
Cd-Rom Symposium Transcript One - 1992, Wendy J. Gordon
Cd-Rom Symposium Transcript One - 1992, Wendy J. Gordon
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Enclosed are the corrected pages of the transcript. The article itself will follow shortly.
Draft Of Reality As Artifact: From Feist To Fair Use - 1992, Wendy J. Gordon
Draft Of Reality As Artifact: From Feist To Fair Use - 1992, Wendy J. Gordon
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Lawyers more than most people should be aware that what language calls "facts" are not necessarily equivalent to things that exist in the world. After all, when in ordinary conversation someone says "It's a fact that this [ X ] happened," the speaker usually means, "I believe the thing I describe has happened in the world". But when a litigator says something is a "fact" she often means only that a good faith argument can be made on behalf of its existence. Two sets of fact finders can look at the same event and come to diametrically opposed conclusions-- each …
Defining The Prisoners' Dilemma, Wendy J. Gordon
Defining The Prisoners' Dilemma, Wendy J. Gordon
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Formally, a prisoner's dilemma is defined as follows: There are two participants symmetrically situated. For each player, her payoff if she refuses to cooperate with the other player is higher than her payoff would be if she cooperated, and this is true whether the other chooses to cooperate, or chooses to defect. If both cooperate, her payoff will be higher than if both defect.