Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 8 of 8

Full-Text Articles in Law

An Incentives Approach To Patent Settlements: A Commentary On Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, Maureen A. O'Rourke Jan 2003

An Incentives Approach To Patent Settlements: A Commentary On Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, Maureen A. O'Rourke

Faculty Scholarship

Professors Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley have attempted to clarify one of the most vexing issues facing antitrust and intellectual property law today: What analytical framework should antitrust authorities and courts use in considering whether patent settlement agreements in infringement cases violate the antitrust laws? The issue is complex because many ostensibly anticompetitive restraints in settlement agreements are perfectly legal if the underlying patent right is valid. Unfortunately, in some cases, the relevant patents are either invalid or not infringed. Thus, the antitrust analysis hinges on resolution of an intellectual property question.


Vertical Restraints And Intellectual Property Law: Beyond Antitrust, Michael J. Meurer Jan 2003

Vertical Restraints And Intellectual Property Law: Beyond Antitrust, Michael J. Meurer

Faculty Scholarship

This Article describes how intellectual property (IP) law regulates six types of vertical restraints: restrictions on the field or location of use; restrictions on sharing; control over the frequency of use; restrictions on repair and modification; packaging requirements; and impediments to a buyer's decision to exit its relationship with a seller. There are three reasons to focus on IP oversight of vertical restraints separately from antitrust oversight. First, IP law covers a broader range of vertical restraints. Second, economic analysis of the antitrust-IP conflict focuses mainly on the potential of vertical restraints to exclude downstream competitors. IP doctrines that regulate …


Controlling Opportunistic And Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, Michael J. Meurer Jan 2003

Controlling Opportunistic And Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, Michael J. Meurer

Faculty Scholarship

It is useful to think of intellectual property (IP) law both as a system of property rights that promotes the production of valuable information and as a system of government regulation that unintentionally promotes socially harmful rent-seeking. This Article analyzes methods of controlling rent-seeking costs associated with opportunistic and anti-competitive IP lawsuits. My thinking is guided to some extent by the analysis of procedural measures for controlling frivolous litigation, and analysis of antitrust reforms designed to control strategic abuse of antitrust law. These analogies lead me to focus on pre-trial and post-trial control measures that reduce the credibility of weak …


Excuse And Justification In The Law Of Fair Use: Transaction Costs Have Always Been Only Part Of The Story, Wendy J. Gordon Jan 2003

Excuse And Justification In The Law Of Fair Use: Transaction Costs Have Always Been Only Part Of The Story, Wendy J. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

In American copyright law, the doctrine of "fair use" has long been problematic. Every plausible litmus test that might simplify the "fair use" inquiry has proven inadequate, and copyright commentators have long sought an algorithm or heuristic to lend predictability and conceptual coherence to the doctrine. Twenty years ago, I published in this Journal an article entitled Fair Use as Market Failure, which suggested that the key to understanding the protean terms of "fair use" could best be found in the notion of market failure. That 1982 article has been often misapplied, by both courts and commentators. I am …


A Brief History Of Author-Publisher Relations And The Outlook For The 21st Century, Maureen A. O'Rourke Jan 2003

A Brief History Of Author-Publisher Relations And The Outlook For The 21st Century, Maureen A. O'Rourke

Faculty Scholarship

The Fiftieth Anniversary Edition of the Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A. provides a particularly appropriate forum in which to discuss the current state of the copyright system. By some accounts, U.S. copyright law has been fabulously successful, encouraging the growth of industries whose copyrighted products both enrich American culture and contribute significant value to the economy.


Intellectual Property Law, Wendy J. Gordon Jan 2003

Intellectual Property Law, Wendy J. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter for the OXFORD HANDBOOK ON LEGAL STUDIES provides an overview of the theoretical literature in Intellectual Property, and suggests directions for further study. The emphasis is on economic analysis, but effort is made to embrace other perspectives as well.


Copyright As Tort Law's Mirror Image: 'Harms', 'Benefits', And The Uses And Limits Of Analogy, Wendy J. Gordon Jan 2003

Copyright As Tort Law's Mirror Image: 'Harms', 'Benefits', And The Uses And Limits Of Analogy, Wendy J. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

This pair of papers involves a reprinting of "Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property," 21 J. LEGAL STUDIES 449 (1992), along with an introduction to that article for students, entitled "Copyright as Tort's Mirror Image". Both involve comparisons between statutory intellectual property law and common law doctrines.

"Copyright as Tort's Mirror" uses personal injury law to introduce students to copyright, making a link between the doctrines through the notion of "externalities". Just as tort law discourages wastefully harmful behavior by making perpetrators bear some of the costs inflicted, copyright law encourages beneficial behavior by enabling authors to …


Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting Of Complex Technologies, James Bessen Jan 2003

Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting Of Complex Technologies, James Bessen

Faculty Scholarship

Patent race models assume that an innovator wins the only patent covering a product. But when technologies are complex, this property right is defective: ownership of a product's technology is shared, not exclusive. In that case I show that if patent standards are low, firms build "thickets" of patents, especially incumbent firms in mature industries. When they assert these patents, innovators are forced to share rents under cross-licenses, making R&D incentives sub-optimal. On the other hand, when lead time advantages are significant and patent standards are high, firms pursue strategies of "mutual non-aggression." Then R&D incentives are stronger, even optimal.