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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Real Wrongs Of Icwa, James G. Dwyer
The Real Wrongs Of Icwa, James G. Dwyer
Faculty Publications
Haaland v. Brackeen rejected federalism-based challenges to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) but signaled receptivity to future challenges based on individual rights. The adult-focused rights claims presented in Haaland, however, miss the mark of what is truly problematic about ICWA. This Article presents an in-depth, children’s-rights based critique of the Act, explaining how it violates a fundamental right against state exertion of power over central aspects of persons’ private lives to their detriment for illicit purposes. In fact, the Act’s defenders are complicit in the same sort of government violence that motivated ICWA’s enactment—erasing aspects of children’s heritage …
Revising The Indian Plenary Power Doctrine, M. Henry Ishtani, Alexandra Fay
Revising The Indian Plenary Power Doctrine, M. Henry Ishtani, Alexandra Fay
Michigan Journal of Race and Law
The federal Indian law doctrine of Congressional plenary power is long overdue for an overhaul. Since its troubling nineteenth-century origins in Kagama v. United States (1886), plenary power has justified invasive Congressional interventions and undermined Tribal sovereignty. The doctrine's legal basis remains a constitutional conundrum. This Article considers the Court's recent engagement with plenary power in Haaland v. Brackeen (2023). It argues that the Brackeen opinions may signal judicial readiness to reevaluate the doctrine. The Article takes ahold of Justice Gorsuch's critical assessment and runs with it, ultimately proposing a method for cleaning up this destructive and constitutionally dubious line …
Federal Indian Law As Method, Matthew L. M. Fletcher
Federal Indian Law As Method, Matthew L. M. Fletcher
Articles
Morton v. Mancari is well-known in Indian law circles as a foundation for the tribal self-determination era, which is generally understood to have begun in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The case involved an Act of Congress that required the federal “Indian Office” (now called the Bureau of Indian Affairs) to grant preference in employment to “Indians.” The case is typically understood as the basis for analyzing how federal statutes that apply exclusively to Indian people do not implicate the anti-discrimination principles of the United States Constitution. This understanding of the case, while correct, is too narrow.