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Full-Text Articles in Law
Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter? Evidence From The Convention Against Torture, Beth A. Simmons, Cosette D. Creamer
Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter? Evidence From The Convention Against Torture, Beth A. Simmons, Cosette D. Creamer
All Faculty Scholarship
International regulatory agreements depend largely on self-reporting for implementation, yet we know almost nothing about whether or how such mechanisms work. We theorize that self-reporting processes provide information for domestic constituencies, with the potential to create pressure for better compliance. Using original data on state reports submitted to the Committee Against Torture, we demonstrate the influence of this process on the pervasiveness of torture and inhumane treatment. We illustrate the power of self-reporting regimes to mobilize domestic politics through evidence of civil society participation in shadow reporting, media attention, and legislative activity around anti-torture law and practice. This is the …
Freedom From Violence And The Law: A Global Perspective In Light Of Chinese Domestic Violence Law, 2015, Rangita De Silva De Alwis, Jeni Klugman
Freedom From Violence And The Law: A Global Perspective In Light Of Chinese Domestic Violence Law, 2015, Rangita De Silva De Alwis, Jeni Klugman
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No abstract provided.
Treaty Options: Towards A Behavioral Understanding Of Treaty Design, Jean Galbraith
Treaty Options: Towards A Behavioral Understanding Of Treaty Design, Jean Galbraith
All Faculty Scholarship
Rational choice theory is the dominant paradigm through which scholars of international law and international relations approach treaty design. In this Article, I suggest a different approach using a combination of empirical observations of state behavior and theoretical insights from behavioral economics. I focus on one aspect of multilateral treaty design: namely, treaty reservations and associated legal mechanisms which allow states to vary the degree of their formal commitments to treaties. I call these mechanisms “treaty options.” I argue that the framing of treaty options matters powerfully — and does so in ways inconsistent with rational choice theory, but consistent …