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Doubts About Daubert: Psychiatric Anecdata As A Case Study, Christopher Slobogin
Doubts About Daubert: Psychiatric Anecdata As A Case Study, Christopher Slobogin
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., the Supreme Court sensibly held that testimony purporting to be scientific is admissible only if it possesses sufficient indicia of scientific validity. In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Court more questionably held that opinion evidence based on "technical" and "specialized" knowledge must meet the same admissibility threshold as scientific testimony. This Article addresses the implications of these two decisions for opinion evidence presented by mental health professionals in criminal trials.
The Criminal Defense Lawyer's Fiduciary Duty To Clients With Mental Disability, Christopher Slobogin, Amy Mashburn
The Criminal Defense Lawyer's Fiduciary Duty To Clients With Mental Disability, Christopher Slobogin, Amy Mashburn
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This Article has argued that the defense attorney has a multifaceted fiduciary duty toward the client with mental disability. That duty requires, first and foremost, respect for the autonomy of the client. The lawyer shows that respect not only by heeding the wishes of the competent client but by refusing to heed the wishes of the incompetent client. A coherent approach to the competency construct is therefore important. Following the lead of Professor Bonnie, this Article has broken competency into two components: assistance competency and decisional competency. It has defined the former concept in traditional terms, as an understanding of …
An End To Insanity: Recasting The Role Of Mental Disability In Criminal Cases, Christopher Slobogin
An End To Insanity: Recasting The Role Of Mental Disability In Criminal Cases, Christopher Slobogin
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This article argues that mental illness should no longer be the basis for a special defense of insanity. Instead, mental disorder should be considered in criminal cases only if relevant to other excuse doctrines, such as lack of mens rea, self-defense and duress, as those defenses have been defined under modern subjectively-oriented codes. With the advent of these subjectively defined doctrines (a development which, ironically, took place during the same period that insanity formulations expanded), the insanity defense has outlived its usefulness, normatively and practically. Modern official formulations of the defense are overbroad because, fairly construed, they exculpate the vast …