Law Commons^™

When Judges Are Theologians: Adjudicating Religious Questions, Michael A. Helfand

Michael A Helfand

The Contraception Mandate Accomodated: Why The Rfra Claim In Zubik V. Burwell Fails, Caroline Mala Corbin

Short Works

No abstract provided.

Deference To Claims Of Substantial Religious Burden, Caroline Mala Corbin

Articles

No abstract provided.

When Free Exercise Is A Burden: Protecting "Third Parties" In Religious Accommodation Law, Kara Loewentheil

Kara Loewentheil

During the 2014 U.S. Supreme Court term, the Court considered two challenges to the contraceptive coverage requirement of the Affordable Care Act. These cases attracted enormous attention, and brought a new urgency to the principle that requests for religious accommodations should be weighed against any burdens such accommodations would impose on “third parties,” who are more accurately termed “existing rights-holders.” However, neither courts nor scholars have provided a consistent or principled way of thinking through how to evaluate such burdens and how to weigh them against free exercise rights. This Article takes up that challenge, using the example of the …

Corporate Religious Liberty: Why Corporations Are Not Entitled To Religious Exemptions, Caroline Mala Corbin

Short Works

No abstract provided.

Rfra Exemptions From The Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation Of Religion, Frederick Mark Gedicks, Rebecca G. Van Tassell

Faculty Scholarship

Litigation surrounding use of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to exempt employers from the Affordable Care Act’s “contraception mandate” is moving steadily towards resolution in the U.S. Supreme Court. Both opponents and supporters of the mandate, however, have overlooked the Establishment Clause limits on such exemptions.

The heated religious-liberty rhetoric aimed at the mandate has obscured that RFRA is a “permissive” rather than “mandatory” accommodation of religion — a government concession to religious belief and practice that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause. Permissive accommodations must satisfy Establishment Clause constraints, notably the requirement that the accommodation not impose …

Delegation And The Destruction Of American Liberties: The Affordable Care Act And The Contraception Mandate, Michael Barone, Jr.

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

"Rfra Exemptions From The Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation Of Religion", Frederick Mark Gedicks, Rebecca G. Van Tassell

Frederick Mark Gedicks

Litigation surrounding use of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to exempt employers from the Affordable Care Act’s “contraception mandate” is moving steadily towards eventual resolution in the U.S. Supreme Court. Both opponents and supporters of the mandate, however, have overlooked Establishment Clause limits on such exemptions. The fiery religious-liberty rhetoric surrounding the mandate has obscured that RFRA is a “permissive” rather than “mandatory” accommodation of religion—that is, a voluntary government concession to religious belief and practice that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause. Permissive accommodations must satisfy Establishment Clause constraints, notably the requirement that the accommodation not impose …

The Contraception Mandate, Caroline Mala Corbin

Articles

Under the new health care regime, health insurance plans must cover contraception. While religious employers are exempt from this requirement, religiously affiliated employers are not. Several have sued, claiming that the "contraception mandate" violates the Free Exercise Clause, the Free Speech Clause, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. This Essay explains why the contraception mandate violates none of them.

With Religious Liberty For All: A Defense Of The Affordable Care Act's Contraception Coverage Mandate, Frederick Mark Gedicks

Faculty Scholarship

The “contraception mandate” of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 poses a straightforward question for religious liberty jurisprudence: Must government excuse a believer from complying with a religiously burdensome law, when doing so would violate the liberty of others by imposing on them the costs and consequences of religious beliefs that they do not share? To ask this question is to answer it: One's religious liberty does not include the right to interfere with the liberty of others, and thus religious liberty may not be used by a religious employer to force employees to pay the costs …

Debate: The Contraception Mandate And Religious Freedom, Steven D. Smith, Caroline Mala Corbin

Articles

No abstract provided.