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Full-Text Articles in Law

Thoughts On Commercial Speech: A Roundtable Discussion, Ronald K.L. Collins, Steven H. Shiffrin, Erwin Chemerinsky, Kathleen M. Sullivan Oct 2007

Thoughts On Commercial Speech: A Roundtable Discussion, Ronald K.L. Collins, Steven H. Shiffrin, Erwin Chemerinsky, Kathleen M. Sullivan

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Adam Liptak, the legal affairs writer for The New York Times, moderates a lively discussion about commercial speech between three esteemed constitutional scholars: Professor Erwin Chemerinsky of Duke University School of Law; Professor Kathleen Sullivan of Stanford Law School; and Professor Steve Shiffrin of Cornell Law School. These scholars debate the proper definition of defining commercial speech, how the corporate identity of a speaker and the content of the speech determines the level of First Amendment protection, whether it is possible to demarcate commercial speech from political speech, and the problems of paternalism and viewpoint discrimination in this complex and …


Second Class For The Second Time: How The Commercial Speech Doctrine Stigmatizes Commercial Use Of Aggregated Public Records, Brian N. Larson, Genelle I. Belmas Jul 2007

Second Class For The Second Time: How The Commercial Speech Doctrine Stigmatizes Commercial Use Of Aggregated Public Records, Brian N. Larson, Genelle I. Belmas

Faculty Scholarship

This Article argues that access to aggregated electronic public records for commercial use should receive protection under the First Amendment in the same measure as the speech acts the access supports. In other words, we view commercial access to aggregated public records as an essential means to valuable speech. For many, however, the taint of the commercial speech doctrine is turning all “information flows” into commercial ones. This, in turn, is threatening the access to government records.


It Depends On What The Meaning Of "False" Is: Falsity And Misleadingness In Commercial Speech Doctrine, Rebecca Tushnet Jan 2007

It Depends On What The Meaning Of "False" Is: Falsity And Misleadingness In Commercial Speech Doctrine, Rebecca Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

While scholarship regarding the Supreme Court's noncommercial speech doctrine has often focused on the level of protection for truthful, non-misleading commercial speech, scholars have paid little attention to the exclusion of false or misleading commercial speech from all First Amendment protection. Examining the underpinnings of the false and misleading speech exclusion illuminates the practical difficulties that abolishing the commercial speech doctrine would pose. Through a series of fact patterns in trademark and false advertising cases, this piece demonstrates that defining what is false or misleading is often debatable. If commercial speech were given First Amendment protection, consumer protection and First …